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CVE-2026-54544

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) in Fireshare APIs

CVE-2026-54544

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized outbound requests and potential access to internal services or cloud metadata

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Fireshare exposes webhook testing endpoints that can be called without authentication and cause the server to send an HTTP POST request to an attacker-selected URL. This server-side request forgery may allow access to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other network resources reachable from the Fireshare host.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Fireshare deployments where the webhook testing API endpoints are reachable without authentication and accept a destination URL from the request. The server then performs the outbound request from its own network context, which may have access to internal addresses, control-plane services, or cloud instance metadata that are not directly reachable by an external requester.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The publicly reachable webhook testing API endpoints
  • Required access: No credentials, session cookies, or prior application access
  • Trigger point: A request to an endpoint that initiates an outbound webhook test
  • Why exploitation is possible: Missing authentication enforcement allows an unauthenticated user to influence the destination of a server-originated HTTP request

Why this happens

The underlying issue is a server-side request forgery condition mapped to CWE-918. Webhook testing functionality accepts attacker-controlled destination information and performs an outbound request without adequately restricting the target or requiring authentication. Because the request originates from the Fireshare server, network access controls and source identity differ from those of the external requester.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may probe services on internal networks
  • An attacker could retrieve responses from cloud metadata services
  • The server may send unauthorized HTTP POST requests to reachable systems
  • Internal applications may receive attacker-controlled data from a trusted network location
  • Sensitive information or service credentials could be exposed depending on network and metadata controls

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on protecting outbound request functionality and reducing trust in user-supplied destinations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require authentication and appropriate authorization for webhook testing operations
  • Permit outbound requests only to explicitly approved destinations
  • Validate and normalize URLs before connection establishment, including redirects
  • Block loopback, link-local, private, reserved, and metadata address ranges
  • Apply egress filtering and network segmentation around application workloads
  • Use a restricted service identity with only the permissions required for webhook operations
  • Avoid returning sensitive upstream response content to untrusted callers

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying outbound HTTP clients that consume request-controlled URLs
  • Code review checks for missing authentication decorators on network-triggering endpoints
  • Tests covering private, loopback, link-local, metadata, and redirect-based destinations
  • Egress firewall and proxy logs showing unexpected requests from Fireshare services
  • Runtime monitoring for webhook requests to internal address ranges or unusual destinations
  • Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted outbound integrations and authenticated administrative actions

Automated security review tools may help identify request-to-network flows, but findings should be validated against deployment-specific network controls.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ShaneIsrael/fireshare/commit/3d786848d2d27344d4cdecf1bd0d54294c6ca160
github.comgithub.com/ShaneIsrael/fireshare/security/advisories/GHSA-w7j7-gv7f-gj92

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The affected endpoints can be reached remotely without authentication when exposed by a Fireshare deployment.

No account, session cookie, or previous access is required. The attacker only needs network reachability to the vulnerable API endpoints.

Require authentication and authorization for webhook testing, then restrict outbound destinations through strict allowlisting and network-level egress controls.

Treat all user-provided URLs as untrusted, block internal and metadata address ranges, validate redirect targets, and monitor outbound requests from application services.

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