Summary
OpenReception's passkey enrollment endpoint accepts a user identifier and attacker-controlled credential without requiring an authenticated session or verifying that enrollment belongs to the current user. An unauthenticated attacker who can identify a tenant and target staff account may inject a passkey, authenticate as that account, and gain access to tenant-scoped administrative capabilities.
Affected context
The issue affects OpenReception deployments using the vulnerable passkey enrollment flow before the security fix. Risk exists when the public booking bootstrap and staff-related public key information expose enough tenant and user identifiers for an unauthenticated party to target accounts, while the enrollment endpoint accepts credentials without session binding or WebAuthn registration verification.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public HTTP authentication, passkey enrollment, and tenant booking endpoints
- Required access: No authenticated session; knowledge of a public tenant identifier and a target staff email may be sufficient
- Trigger point: Submission of a passkey enrollment request followed by the normal passkey login flow
- Why exploitation is possible: The enrollment operation accepts attacker-controlled credentials for a supplied user identifier without authenticating the requester or binding enrollment to the current user
- Scope limitation: The described tenant-scoped path can reach staff and tenant-administrator accounts, while global-administrator accounts are not necessarily exposed through the same route
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an authentication-boundary failure mapped to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. A sensitive passkey enrollment operation trusts a request-body user identifier and stores a credential without requiring an authenticated session, performing registration verification, or confirming that the identifier belongs to the authenticated principal. This insecure pattern permits an unauthenticated party to create an authentication factor for another account and subsequently use the normal login process as that account.
Potential impact
- An attacker may obtain a valid staff session
- Tenant data may be exposed or modified
- Tenant-administrator accounts may be targeted for further takeover
- Appointment resources and key shares could be altered or deleted
- Encrypted appointment data could become permanently undecryptable
- Booking services may be disrupted or taken offline
- Additional tenant compromise or lateral movement could occur within the application's authorization scope
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally requires treating passkey enrollment as a privileged, authenticated account-management operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require an authenticated session before adding or replacing a passkey
- Bind the enrollment target to the authenticated session identity rather than trusting a request-body user identifier
- Invoke complete WebAuthn registration verification, including challenge, origin, RP ID, and attestation-policy checks as appropriate
- Require explicit user presence or a separate verified recovery workflow for additional credentials
- Apply authorization checks before any credential is stored
- Minimize disclosure of user identifiers and public account metadata through unauthenticated endpoints
- Enforce least privilege for staff and tenant-administrator sessions
- Use secure recovery and credential-revocation procedures for suspected account compromise
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review rules that flag credential-enrollment handlers accepting user IDs from request bodies
- Checks that passkey registration invokes WebAuthn verification before persistence
- Review signals showing account-management actions without authentication or authorization middleware
- Tests attempting credential enrollment while unauthenticated or while targeting another account
- Monitoring for unexpected passkey additions, repeated enrollment attempts, and immediate login from newly registered credentials
- API policy enforcement requiring authenticated identity binding for credential-management endpoints
- Automated security review tools that identify missing authentication checks and confused-deputy patterns

