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CVE-2026-54419

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in PIAF-HMS Hotel Management System

CVE-2026-54419

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Arbitrary Database Access and Manipulation

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

PIAF-HMS (PBX-In-A-Flash Hotel Management System) contains multiple unauthenticated SQL injection flaws where HTTP parameters are directly concatenated into SQL queries.

Because the application lacks any authentication and input handling, a remote attacker can inject arbitrary SQL to read, modify, or delete hotel management data in the backing database.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the PIAF-HMS hotel management web application across several PHP endpoints (such as rooms.php, checkuser.php, ec.php, checkin.php, wakeup.php, bills.php, rates.php, and checkout.php).

It manifests when the application is deployed with its default behavior of accepting HTTP GET/POST parameters and issuing SQL queries via the deprecated mysql_* extension, without any authentication layer, input validation, or query parameterization.

Any internet- or network-exposed instance that connects to a database with hotel-related records is likely exposed, depending on surrounding network controls and database permissions.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal web interface of PIAF-HMS over HTTP/HTTPS.
  • Required access: None; no login or credentials are required to reach the vulnerable endpoints.
  • Trigger point: Attacker-controlled GET/POST parameters that are concatenated into SQL statements (e.g., ID, Ext, date and extension fields, check-in/check-out data, billing fields).
  • Why exploitation is possible: User input is inserted directly into SQL query strings using string concatenation and mysql_query() without sanitization, escaping, or use of prepared statements, allowing crafted values to alter the intended SQL logic.

Why this happens

The core issue is classical SQL injection, mapped to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command.

PIAF-HMS constructs SQL statements by concatenating raw HTTP parameters (from $_GET and $_POST) into query strings, assuming they are safe and syntactically benign.

The use of deprecated mysql_* APIs reinforces an outdated pattern: dynamically building query text from untrusted input instead of using prepared statements or robust input validation.

Since the application completely lacks an authentication layer, the attack surface is maximized: any caller can provide malicious parameters that the database interprets as part of the query, enabling arbitrary data access and manipulation within the limits of the database account privileges.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may read sensitive hotel data, such as guest information, room assignments, and billing records.
  • Attackers may modify or delete room, billing, and reservation records, disrupting hotel operations.
  • Attacker-controlled changes can corrupt application state, leading to financial discrepancies or operational outages.
  • Attackers can potentially create or elevate application-level accounts if the schema stores credentials or authorization data in the same database.
  • Attackers may infer or exfiltrate database structure and configuration, aiding further compromise.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation centers on eliminating direct string concatenation of user input into SQL and narrowing the trust boundary around database operations.

Recommended design and coding patterns include:

  • Refactoring all database access to use parameterized queries or prepared statements, binding user input as data rather than query text.
  • Introducing an authentication and session management layer so that sensitive operations are only reachable to authenticated and authorized users.
  • Applying strict server-side validation and type enforcement on all incoming parameters (e.g., numeric IDs, constrained enums, whitelist-validated dates).
  • Centralizing database access through a data access layer that enforces safe query construction and prohibits ad-hoc query building in page controllers.
  • Adopting modern database libraries or ORM frameworks that encourage safe-by-default query APIs and discourage legacy mysql_* usage.
  • Granting the application's database user least-privilege rights, limiting the damage from any injected queries (for example, read-only for reporting views where possible).

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or linters to flag use of mysql_query() and other mysql_* APIs where arguments are derived from $_GET, $_POST, or other unsanitized sources, especially involving string concatenation (. operator) or interpolation.
  • Code review cues: During manual reviews, focus on endpoints that handle form submissions or URL parameters, checking for direct embedding of variables in SQL strings and absence of parameter binding and validation.
  • Security testing: Employ automated DAST scanners or manual penetration tests to probe parameters with SQL meta-characters and observe for errors, anomalous responses, or unexpected data leakage.
  • Logging and monitoring: Implement structured logging of SQL errors and suspicious query patterns and feed them into SIEM or alerting pipelines to detect exploitation attempts and tune defensive filters.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/claudiopizzillo/PIAF-HMS
github.comgithub.com/claudiopizzillo/PIAF-HMS/blob/389d2633441b65ced1c104212cd62be2bfca21e5/ec.php#L57
github.comgithub.com/claudiopizzillo/PIAF-HMS/blob/389d2633441b65ced1c104212cd62be2bfca21e5/rooms.php#L16

Frequently asked

questions

The issue is broadly exploitable because the affected endpoints are unauthenticated and accept attacker-controlled input over HTTP, meaning any party with network access to the application can attempt SQL injection.

No. The application lacks an authentication mechanism for the vulnerable scripts, so exploitation does not require any login or existing account.

The strongest fix is to refactor all database interactions to use parameterized queries or prepared statements, enforce strict input validation, and introduce authentication and authorization controls around data-modifying operations.

Prevention relies on adopting secure coding standards that forbid query string concatenation with untrusted data, using modern database abstraction layers or ORMs, enforcing code review and automated scanning for unsafe patterns, and designing the application around least-privilege and defense-in-depth principles.

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