/

CVE-2026-54356

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Broken Access Control (CWE-862) in Budibase Attachments

CVE-2026-54356

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized access to cloud storage objects

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Budibase contains a broken access control issue in its attachment URL endpoint, where authenticated users with the BASIC role can provide arbitrary storage bucket and key values. Under affected configurations, this may allow them to obtain signed or public URLs backed by stored Amazon S3 datasource credentials and access objects beyond their intended scope.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Budibase published applications that expose the attachment URL API and use an S3 datasource. Risk is present when a user with the BASIC role can reach the endpoint and the server accepts attacker-controlled bucket and key parameters without sufficiently enforcing object- or datasource-level authorization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The attachment URL API endpoint at /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url
  • Required access: An authenticated user able to use a published Budibase application with the BASIC role
  • Trigger point: A request that supplies attacker-controlled storage bucket and object key values
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately constrain the requested storage location and object to resources permitted for the requesting user

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authorization design failure in an API that generates storage URLs. The endpoint uses caller-controlled resource identifiers while relying on stored S3 datasource credentials, without consistently enforcing whether the caller is authorized to access the selected bucket and key. This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, in which authenticated users can reach functionality or resources outside their assigned permissions.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain signed URLs for unauthorized S3 objects
  • An attacker could access or disclose sensitive files stored in connected buckets
  • Generated public URLs may broaden exposure of otherwise restricted objects
  • Organizations could experience data leakage, privacy violations, or downstream abuse of exposed content

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the point where storage URLs are generated and reducing trust in client-supplied resource identifiers.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving permitted buckets, prefixes, and object keys from server-side application state rather than accepting them as authoritative client input
  • Enforcing datasource-, tenant-, application-, and object-level authorization before generating any URL
  • Using narrowly scoped, short-lived storage credentials and presigned URLs
  • Applying least privilege to the IAM identities used for storage access
  • Avoiding public object access unless it is explicitly required and governed
  • Logging and reviewing URL-generation requests, authorization decisions, and unusual object access patterns

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review for endpoints that combine user-controlled bucket or key values with privileged storage credentials
  • Review of authorization checks surrounding signed URL and public URL generation
  • Testing requests across roles, tenants, datasources, prefixes, and object identifiers
  • Policy enforcement requiring server-side ownership and scope checks before cloud-resource access
  • Monitoring for unusual URL-generation volume, cross-tenant object references, and access to unexpected storage prefixes

Automated security review tools may help identify endpoints where authentication is present but resource authorization is incomplete.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.41.3
github.comgithub.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-6x9p-4r67-5gjx

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation generally requires authentication to a published Budibase application and a BASIC-role account, together with access to the affected attachment URL functionality.

The endpoint is described as returning signedUrl and publicUrl values backed by stored S3 datasource credentials. This may expose access to selected objects without necessarily revealing the underlying credentials themselves.

Enforce server-side authorization for every requested datasource, bucket, prefix, and object before generating a URL, and use narrowly scoped, short-lived credentials or presigned URLs.

Treat client-supplied resource identifiers as untrusted, perform object-level authorization consistently, apply least-privilege cloud permissions, and test access boundaries across roles and tenants.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.