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CVE-2026-54348

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in Froxlor Admin API Endpoints

CVE-2026-54348

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Arbitrary database query manipulation, sensitive data disclosure, and potential privilege escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Froxlor versions before 2.3.8 contain SQL injection flaws in API paths that process administrator IP address lists. An authenticated administrator with the required server-settings permission may store crafted data that is later incorporated into SQL queries, potentially exposing database records such as administrator usernames and password hashes.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Froxlor administrator-management and IP, port, and domain listing workflows. It requires an administrator account with change_serversettings permission to influence the stored IP address array, after which a subsequent request through the affected listing functionality may process the poisoned data. Deployments using affected releases and database-backed API operations are exposed to this risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated Froxlor API endpoints for administrator, IP, port, and domain management
  • Required access: An authenticated administrator with change_serversettings permission
  • Trigger point: A later listing request made through the account or workflow that consumes the stored IP address data
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled array elements are stored without numeric type enforcement and later concatenated into SQL IN clauses without parameterization or safe casting

Why this happens

The underlying bug is SQL injection caused by treating attacker-controlled array elements as trusted SQL syntax. The administrator APIs accept and persist values without enforcing the expected numeric type, while downstream listing code decodes those values and builds query fragments through string concatenation. This insecure data flow maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, because input is incorporated into database statements without parameter binding or reliable type validation.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could retrieve unauthorized database records
  • Administrator login names and password hashes may be disclosed
  • Database contents could be modified or destroyed, depending on account and database privileges
  • Application-level privilege escalation could occur
  • Other tenants, domains, or operational data may be exposed
  • Broader database or application compromise could result from excessive database permissions

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on separating data from SQL syntax and reducing trust in administrative input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use parameterized queries for every value in IN clauses and related statements
  • Enforce strict numeric schemas for IP address identifier arrays before storage and again before query construction
  • Reject unexpected types, formats, and values rather than coercing ambiguous input
  • Prefer database abstraction mechanisms that safely expand collections into bound parameters
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to the Froxlor database account
  • Avoid storing raw request structures when a normalized, validated representation is sufficient
  • Treat administrator-provided values as untrusted despite the authenticated role

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis rules that flag SQL string concatenation involving request data, decoded JSON, or array elements
  • Code review checks for dynamic IN clauses lacking bound parameters
  • Tests that submit unexpected scalar types, strings, and malformed collection values to administrative APIs
  • Database monitoring for anomalous listing queries, unexpected unions, or unusual access to credential-related tables
  • Policy enforcement requiring parameterized queries and schema validation for all API-controlled database inputs
  • Neutral automated review tools that identify tainted data flowing from API requests into query construction

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/a1eaca5a1601c8a30e00814a4fc73ad0c185f89e
github.comgithub.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8
github.comgithub.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through Froxlor's authenticated API when the affected endpoints are reachable and the attacker has the required administrator permission. It is not generally an unauthenticated attack.

The attacker needs an authenticated administrator account with change_serversettings permission and access to the relevant API workflows.

Keep user-controlled values separate from SQL syntax by using parameterized queries, strict numeric validation, and safe collection-binding mechanisms for IN clauses.

Treat all API input as untrusted, validate types at trust boundaries and before database use, apply least-privilege database permissions, and include taint-analysis and negative-input tests in development and review processes.

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