Summary
Froxlor versions before 2.3.8 contain SQL injection flaws in API paths that process administrator IP address lists. An authenticated administrator with the required server-settings permission may store crafted data that is later incorporated into SQL queries, potentially exposing database records such as administrator usernames and password hashes.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Froxlor administrator-management and IP, port, and domain listing workflows. It requires an administrator account with change_serversettings permission to influence the stored IP address array, after which a subsequent request through the affected listing functionality may process the poisoned data. Deployments using affected releases and database-backed API operations are exposed to this risk.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated Froxlor API endpoints for administrator, IP, port, and domain management
- Required access: An authenticated administrator with
change_serversettingspermission - Trigger point: A later listing request made through the account or workflow that consumes the stored IP address data
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled array elements are stored without numeric type enforcement and later concatenated into SQL
INclauses without parameterization or safe casting
Why this happens
The underlying bug is SQL injection caused by treating attacker-controlled array elements as trusted SQL syntax. The administrator APIs accept and persist values without enforcing the expected numeric type, while downstream listing code decodes those values and builds query fragments through string concatenation. This insecure data flow maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, because input is incorporated into database statements without parameter binding or reliable type validation.
Potential impact
- An attacker could retrieve unauthorized database records
- Administrator login names and password hashes may be disclosed
- Database contents could be modified or destroyed, depending on account and database privileges
- Application-level privilege escalation could occur
- Other tenants, domains, or operational data may be exposed
- Broader database or application compromise could result from excessive database permissions
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation typically focuses on separating data from SQL syntax and reducing trust in administrative input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries for every value in
INclauses and related statements - Enforce strict numeric schemas for IP address identifier arrays before storage and again before query construction
- Reject unexpected types, formats, and values rather than coercing ambiguous input
- Prefer database abstraction mechanisms that safely expand collections into bound parameters
- Apply least-privilege permissions to the Froxlor database account
- Avoid storing raw request structures when a normalized, validated representation is sufficient
- Treat administrator-provided values as untrusted despite the authenticated role
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules that flag SQL string concatenation involving request data, decoded JSON, or array elements
- Code review checks for dynamic
INclauses lacking bound parameters - Tests that submit unexpected scalar types, strings, and malformed collection values to administrative APIs
- Database monitoring for anomalous listing queries, unexpected unions, or unusual access to credential-related tables
- Policy enforcement requiring parameterized queries and schema validation for all API-controlled database inputs
- Neutral automated review tools that identify tainted data flowing from API requests into query construction

