Summary
An information disclosure flaw in n8n allows an authenticated workflow creator to exfiltrate SecurityScorecard API tokens by configuring a report download operation to call an attacker-controlled URL.
When this misconfiguration occurs, the SecurityScorecard node attaches the API token to outbound requests regardless of allowed domain restrictions, exposing credentials to the attacker's host.
Affected context
The issue arises in n8n instances where users can create or modify workflows that leverage a SecurityScorecard credential with restricted domains.
It manifests specifically in workflows using the SecurityScorecard node's report download operation, which sends outbound HTTP requests.
In environments where workflow designers can set arbitrary URLs, the node may include sensitive authentication data in requests that fall outside intended credential scoping.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: n8n workflow configuration interface and execution engine.
- Required access: Authenticated user with permissions to create/modify workflows and access to a SecurityScorecard credential configured with limited allowed domains.
- Trigger point: Configuration of the SecurityScorecard node's report download operation to send a request to an attacker-controlled URL, followed by workflow execution.
- Why exploitation is possible: The node implementation attaches the SecurityScorecard API token to outbound requests without enforcing the credential's domain restrictions, allowing the token to be transmitted to arbitrary endpoints.
Why this happens
The vulnerability stems from improper handling of sensitive credentials within a workflow node that performs outbound HTTP requests.
Conceptually, this maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, because the SecurityScorecard API token is included in requests beyond its intended scope.
The design flaw lies in trusting node configuration and failing to enforce credential binding to approved domains, allowing a user-controlled URL to become an unintended sink for secret data.
Potential impact
- An attacker-controlled endpoint may receive the SecurityScorecard API token.
- Attackers could use the exfiltrated token to access SecurityScorecard APIs and associated account data.
- Compromise of linked SecurityScorecard account, including security ratings and reports.
- Potential pivot into other systems if the credential grants broader capabilities or reveals sensitive organizational information.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on limiting how and where sensitive credentials are attached to outbound requests and reducing trust in user-configured endpoints.
Recommended patterns include:
- Binding credentials to well-defined, vetted endpoint domains within node implementations and rejecting arbitrary URLs when authentication headers are involved.
- Separating generic HTTP call capabilities from nodes that automatically add credentials, ensuring secrets are only sent where explicitly safe.
- Applying least-privilege principles to credentials, granting only the minimal permissions required for the node's intended operations.
- Centralizing secret management behind access controls, and avoiding exposing raw tokens in workflow configuration or runtime logs.
- Introducing safe defaults that prevent credentials from being attached unless destination validation passes, and failing closed on misconfiguration.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can focus on both configuration patterns and runtime behavior.
Common approaches include:
- Static or configuration analysis to identify workflow nodes that send authenticated requests to non-approved or dynamic URLs.
- Code review practices that look for nodes attaching credentials to arbitrary HTTP destinations, especially where the URL is user-controlled.
- Policy enforcement in CI/CD pipelines to restrict introduction of workflow components that transmit secrets outside defined service domains.
- Monitoring and alerting on outbound requests that include authentication headers or tokens to unexpected hosts, using network telemetry or API gateway logs.

