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CVE-2026-54304

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

Credential Exfiltration (CWE-200) via n8n Node Misuse

CVE-2026-54304

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Credential Exfiltration and Data Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An information disclosure flaw in n8n allows an authenticated workflow creator to exfiltrate SecurityScorecard API tokens by configuring a report download operation to call an attacker-controlled URL.

When this misconfiguration occurs, the SecurityScorecard node attaches the API token to outbound requests regardless of allowed domain restrictions, exposing credentials to the attacker's host.

Affected context

The issue arises in n8n instances where users can create or modify workflows that leverage a SecurityScorecard credential with restricted domains.

It manifests specifically in workflows using the SecurityScorecard node's report download operation, which sends outbound HTTP requests.

In environments where workflow designers can set arbitrary URLs, the node may include sensitive authentication data in requests that fall outside intended credential scoping.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: n8n workflow configuration interface and execution engine.
  • Required access: Authenticated user with permissions to create/modify workflows and access to a SecurityScorecard credential configured with limited allowed domains.
  • Trigger point: Configuration of the SecurityScorecard node's report download operation to send a request to an attacker-controlled URL, followed by workflow execution.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The node implementation attaches the SecurityScorecard API token to outbound requests without enforcing the credential's domain restrictions, allowing the token to be transmitted to arbitrary endpoints.

Why this happens

The vulnerability stems from improper handling of sensitive credentials within a workflow node that performs outbound HTTP requests.

Conceptually, this maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, because the SecurityScorecard API token is included in requests beyond its intended scope.

The design flaw lies in trusting node configuration and failing to enforce credential binding to approved domains, allowing a user-controlled URL to become an unintended sink for secret data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker-controlled endpoint may receive the SecurityScorecard API token.
  • Attackers could use the exfiltrated token to access SecurityScorecard APIs and associated account data.
  • Compromise of linked SecurityScorecard account, including security ratings and reports.
  • Potential pivot into other systems if the credential grants broader capabilities or reveals sensitive organizational information.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on limiting how and where sensitive credentials are attached to outbound requests and reducing trust in user-configured endpoints.

Recommended patterns include:

  • Binding credentials to well-defined, vetted endpoint domains within node implementations and rejecting arbitrary URLs when authentication headers are involved.
  • Separating generic HTTP call capabilities from nodes that automatically add credentials, ensuring secrets are only sent where explicitly safe.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to credentials, granting only the minimal permissions required for the node's intended operations.
  • Centralizing secret management behind access controls, and avoiding exposing raw tokens in workflow configuration or runtime logs.
  • Introducing safe defaults that prevent credentials from being attached unless destination validation passes, and failing closed on misconfiguration.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can focus on both configuration patterns and runtime behavior.

Common approaches include:

  • Static or configuration analysis to identify workflow nodes that send authenticated requests to non-approved or dynamic URLs.
  • Code review practices that look for nodes attaching credentials to arbitrary HTTP destinations, especially where the URL is user-controlled.
  • Policy enforcement in CI/CD pipelines to restrict introduction of workflow components that transmit secrets outside defined service domains.
  • Monitoring and alerting on outbound requests that include authentication headers or tokens to unexpected hosts, using network telemetry or API gateway logs.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-rm2v-h48j-895m

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation requires authenticated access to the n8n instance. A remote attacker must first obtain an account with permissions to create or modify workflows and access the relevant SecurityScorecard credential.

The attacker needs to be an authenticated user with permissions to design or edit workflows and to associate the SecurityScorecard credential with a workflow node. No direct server-level access is required beyond the application role.

Ensure that nodes or components attaching credentials enforce strict endpoint validation and domain binding. Secrets should only be sent to explicitly trusted services, and any user-specified URL should be treated as untrusted unless it passes rigorous checks.

Adopt secure-by-design credential handling: separate generic HTTP nodes from credentialed nodes, enforce least privilege on tokens, validate destinations before attaching secrets, and use automated reviews to flag patterns where user-controlled configuration influences where credentials are sent.

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