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CVE-2026-54299

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

SSRF via Host Header Validation (CWE-918) in Astro

CVE-2026-54299

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-918

Impact:

Server-Side Request Forgery and Sensitive Data Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Astro SSR applications with prerendered error pages can be tricked into fetching error content from attacker-controlled origins when the Host header is not properly validated.

Under these conditions, a crafted request can cause the server to perform server-side requests to arbitrary hosts and expose response data to the attacker.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Astro server-side rendered (SSR) applications that:

  • Use prerendered error pages such as /404 or /500 with export const prerender = true
  • Dynamically fetch these prerendered error pages at runtime when handling errors
  • Derive the fetch URL from request.url, whose origin is based on the incoming Host header
  • Do not validate the Host header against a configured set of allowedDomains or an equivalent origin-allowlist

In such deployments, the application's internal HTTP client can be coerced into sending requests to unintended internal or external targets.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public-facing Astro SSR endpoints handling HTTP requests
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the application, including setting arbitrary Host headers
  • Trigger point: An error condition that causes the server to fetch the prerendered /404 or /500 page, using a URL derived from request.url
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application trusts the Host header to construct the origin of the fetch URL without enforcing a strict allowlist, enabling redirection of the internal fetch to attacker-chosen hosts

Why this happens

The core issue is improper input validation on the Host header (CWE-20) combined with server-side request construction based on that untrusted value, leading to server-side request forgery (CWE-918).

The SSR error handling logic builds a fetch URL for prerendered error pages from request.url, which inherits its origin from the incoming Host header.

Without validating this header against a set of known-good domains, the server can be tricked into issuing HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts, including internal network services or metadata endpoints, and returning their responses.

Potential impact

  • Access to internal HTTP services that are not directly exposed to the internet
  • Reading sensitive data from internal endpoints (e.g., admin panels, internal APIs, cloud metadata services)
  • Pivoting into internal networks through the web server as a proxy
  • Potential information leakage about network topology and available services
  • Assisting other attack chains, such as credential theft or configuration disclosure

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally focuses on constraining how origins and hosts are derived and used in server-side requests:

  • Enforce strict validation of the Host header (or equivalent origin source) against an explicit allowlist of allowedDomains
  • Avoid constructing internal fetch URLs directly from user-controlled values such as Host, X-Forwarded-Host, or request.url without normalizing and validating them
  • Centralize origin and base-URL configuration so that server-side fetches always target known, static hosts rather than dynamic request-derived origins
  • Where possible, decouple prerendered error page retrieval from runtime HTTP fetches, favoring in-process rendering or local/static asset access
  • Run the application with least-privilege network access, restricting outbound connectivity to only those destinations that are required for normal operation

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor this class of issue by:

  • Using static analysis or linters to flag patterns where server-side HTTP clients build URLs from request.url, Host, or similar request headers
  • Including checks in code review for any logic that consumes the Host header or constructs dynamic origins for internal fetches
  • Implementing application security tests (DAST) that attempt SSRF via manipulated Host headers and observe whether the server accesses unexpected endpoints
  • Applying runtime monitoring and egress filtering to detect unusual outbound HTTP traffic from web servers, especially to internal IP ranges or known metadata services
  • Leveraging automated security scanning tools that include rules for SSRF and improper Host header validation

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-2pvr-wf23-7pc7

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An external attacker who can send HTTP requests to the affected Astro SSR application and control the Host header can attempt to exploit this issue, provided the deployment does not enforce strict host validation.

The attacker typically needs only network access to the application's HTTP interface.

They must be able to craft requests with a manipulated Host header and trigger error handling that fetches the prerendered error pages.

The safest pattern is to validate all host and origin information against an explicit allowlist before using it to build server-side request URLs, and to avoid basing internal fetch targets directly on untrusted request headers.

Additionally, structuring error handling so that prerendered content is served without runtime HTTP fetches further reduces risk.

Define clear trust boundaries for all request-derived data, treat headers like Host as untrusted input, and enforce strict validation and normalization before use.

Pair these practices with code review checklists, static analysis rules for SSRF patterns, and network egress controls that limit where servers can connect.

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