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CVE-2026-54239

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CBC Token Tampering (CWE-345) in FaustWP WordPress Plugin

CVE-2026-54239

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-345, CWE-639

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

FaustWP fails to authenticate the initialization vector used to decrypt certain authorization tokens. A logged-in non-administrator who obtains an authorization code may alter the token contents without invalidating its HMAC, potentially gaining Administrator-level WordPress access.

Affected context

The issue occurs in FaustWP authentication handling when token encryption uses CBC mode but the initialization vector is excluded from HMAC coverage. Deployments are at risk when a lower-privileged authenticated user can obtain an authorization code through the token-generation endpoint and the resulting token is accepted for WordPress REST API authorization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: FaustWP authentication endpoints and WordPress REST API authorization
  • Required access: A valid logged-in non-administrator account
  • Trigger point: Generation and subsequent processing of an authorization token
  • Why exploitation is possible: The initialization vector is not authenticated, allowing token fields affected by CBC decryption to change while the ciphertext HMAC remains valid

Why this happens

The authentication design verifies the ciphertext but omits the corresponding initialization vector from the integrity check. In CBC mode, changing an unauthenticated initialization vector can predictably alter the first decrypted block, including security-sensitive token fields such as token type or user identifier. This is an instance of CWE-345, Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity, and can also enable CWE-639-style authorization decisions based on manipulated identifiers.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could bypass intended authorization boundaries
  • An attacker may obtain Administrator-level WordPress REST API access
  • An attacker could create or modify administrator accounts
  • An attacker may install or alter plugins
  • An attacker could execute arbitrary code through privileged WordPress functionality
  • An attacker could compromise site content, credentials, or connected systems

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on authenticating every value that influences token decryption and authorization decisions.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use authenticated encryption modes that bind ciphertext, initialization vectors, and associated metadata together
  • If an encrypt-then-MAC design is retained, include the initialization vector and relevant token context in the MAC input
  • Validate token type, subject identity, audience, expiry, and privilege claims independently after decryption
  • Avoid deriving authorization solely from mutable decrypted identifiers
  • Apply least privilege to application accounts and WordPress service integrations
  • Rotate affected signing or encryption secrets and review existing tokens when compromise is suspected
  • Restrict privileged REST API operations and plugin-management capabilities where they are not required

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis and code review for encryption or MAC routines that omit initialization vectors, nonces, headers, or authentication metadata from integrity coverage. Reviewers can trace token-generation and token-validation flows to confirm that authenticated claims are independently validated and that privilege decisions do not rely solely on decrypted user-controlled values. Runtime monitoring may flag unusual authorization-code use, sudden elevation to administrator identities, administrator-account creation, plugin installation, or unexpected REST API activity. Security policies can require authenticated encryption for new token formats and automated review tools can identify incomplete MAC constructions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/wpengine/faustjs/commit/cda00de7290f9b178cb1652d30b4cdf5bb8688d0
github.comgithub.com/wpengine/faustjs/pull/2386
github.comgithub.com/wpengine/faustjs/security/advisories/GHSA-q6pm-r77q-qcv3

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation generally requires an authenticated, non-administrator WordPress user who can obtain an authorization code through the FaustWP flow.

No direct server or filesystem access is necessarily required. The relevant exposure is the reachable authentication and token-processing functionality, subject to the site's access controls.

Use authenticated encryption or ensure the initialization vector, ciphertext, and security-relevant token context are all covered by integrity protection. Validate identity and privilege claims separately.

Treat all token components as untrusted, review cryptographic constructions as complete protocols, enforce least privilege, and monitor for anomalous administrator and plugin-management activity.

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