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CVE-2026-53984

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in Ground Station SQLite

CVE-2026-53984

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Database Destruction and Data Integrity Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Ground Station exposes a Socket.IO database backup handler without requiring authentication, allowing any reachable network peer to submit a full database restore request. An attacker may erase the SQLite database or inject fabricated records, including orbital-source URLs and observation schedules that can redirect later synchronization activity.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Ground Station deployments using the Socket.IO server and its database_backup event handler when authentication enforcement is disabled and the service is reachable on its network port. A permissive cross-origin policy may further broaden browser-based access, while the handler accepts caller-supplied SQL for full database restoration without an adequately protected trust boundary.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Socket.IO server, commonly exposed on port 7000
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the Socket.IO service; no valid credentials are required when authentication enforcement is disabled
  • Trigger point: The database_backup event's full-restore operation
  • Why exploitation is possible: The handler accepts an attacker-controlled SQL blob and executes it through a raw database execution path, allowing existing tables and records to be replaced

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an administrative database operation exposed without authentication or authorization checks. The handler treats network-supplied restore content as trusted SQL and executes it directly, combining CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function with insufficient separation between backup-management functionality and untrusted clients. A wildcard CORS policy can increase exposure but does not replace the primary authentication failure.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may delete all satellite records, orbital sources, hardware configurations, and observation schedules.
  • An attacker could inject fabricated database structures and records.
  • Ground-station synchronization may be redirected to attacker-controlled orbital-source URLs.
  • Observation workflows may be altered, disrupted, or populated with unauthorized entries.
  • Operators may lose data availability and confidence in the integrity of ground-station state.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on protecting database-management functions with strong authentication and explicit authorization.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require authenticated, narrowly authorized access for backup and restore operations.
  • Avoid accepting raw SQL from network clients; use validated backup formats and controlled restore workflows.
  • Enforce strict schemas, allowlists, and integrity checks for imported records.
  • Bind administrative services to trusted interfaces and restrict network exposure through segmentation and policy controls.
  • Configure restrictive, explicit cross-origin policies rather than wildcard access.
  • Run the service with least-privilege database and operating-system permissions, and maintain tested offline backups.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Static-analysis findings where unauthenticated Socket.IO events invoke database administration or raw SQL APIs.
  • Code-review signals such as disabled authentication middleware, wildcard CORS configuration, and restore handlers that accept client-provided SQL.
  • Network monitoring for unexpected connections to the Socket.IO service and unusual database_backup event activity.
  • Database auditing for bulk table drops, unexpected schema recreation, or large insert operations.
  • Policy enforcement requiring authentication and authorization checks for administrative endpoints and database restore workflows.

Automated security review tools can help identify missing access-control checks and dangerous database execution patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/sgoudelis/ground-station
github.comgithub.com/sgoudelis/ground-station/commit/2ecde82a8814cbea18883ce023bf45cbf06172eb
github.comgithub.com/sgoudelis/ground-station/security/advisories/GHSA-mjp8-x6h7-229q

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when the Socket.IO service is reachable by an attacker and authentication enforcement remains disabled. Network reachability is required, but local access is not necessarily required.

No. The described condition allows an unauthenticated peer to reach the database backup handler. Network controls may still limit who can connect.

Protect the handler with strong authentication and least-privilege authorization, and replace client-supplied raw SQL with a validated, integrity-checked restore format.

Treat backup and restore operations as privileged administrative functions, enforce restrictive network and cross-origin policies, audit database changes, and test access-control requirements in code review and automated security checks.

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