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CVE-2026-53932

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in Laravel Backup Restore

CVE-2026-53932

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A high-severity command injection vulnerability in laravel-backup-restore can allow a crafted database backup archive to cause operating system commands to run during restoration. The issue becomes risky when an attacker can supply or influence an archive processed by the restore workflow.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in deployments using laravel-backup-restore to restore database backups created with spatie/laravel-backup. Risk depends on whether untrusted or attacker-controlled backup archives can reach the restore process and whether the restoration service has permissions to invoke system-level database or operating-system operations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Backup archive restoration functionality
  • Required access: Ability to provide, upload, replace, or otherwise influence a backup archive selected for restoration
  • Trigger point: Processing the crafted archive during database restore
  • Why exploitation is possible: Archive-controlled data reaches an operating-system command execution path without sufficient separation between data and command arguments

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an OS command injection condition in the backup restoration workflow. Data extracted from or derived from a crafted archive is incorporated into a system command without reliable argument separation or strict validation, allowing command syntax to be interpreted by the operating system. This maps primarily to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component describing the broader command-construction weakness.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands in the restore process context.
  • The application or hosting environment could be compromised.
  • Sensitive backup data, credentials, or application files may be exposed.
  • Data could be modified, deleted, or replaced during or after restoration.
  • A compromised service account could enable lateral movement where permissions allow.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on preventing archive-controlled values from becoming executable command syntax.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using APIs that pass commands and arguments as structured values rather than constructing shell command strings.
  • Applying strict allowlist validation to archive names, database identifiers, paths, and restore options.
  • Treating uploaded or externally sourced archives as untrusted until verified.
  • Separating archive extraction from privileged restoration operations.
  • Running restore workers with least-privilege identities and restricted filesystem and network access.
  • Enforcing resource, path, and archive-content controls to reduce abuse of restoration inputs.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for command-construction patterns in restoration code, including shell invocation APIs, string concatenation involving archive-derived values, shell interpolation, and unvalidated subprocess arguments. Code review should examine every path from archive metadata or extracted content to process execution, while static analysis and automated review tools can flag shell execution and unsafe argument handling. Runtime monitoring can also alert on unexpected child processes, command interpreters, or outbound connections from backup-restore workers.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/stefanzweifel/laravel-backup-restore/commit/a73f6c3dfd57c5efbc46cce4e93ed033bedce8b0
github.comgithub.com/stefanzweifel/laravel-backup-restore/pull/116
github.comgithub.com/stefanzweifel/laravel-backup-restore/releases/tag/v1.9.4
github.comgithub.com/stefanzweifel/laravel-backup-restore/security/advisories/GHSA-w9mx-xmg4-gc4r

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on deployment exposure. An attacker generally needs a way to place or influence a backup archive that will be processed by the restoration workflow.

Not necessarily, but access to the backup upload, selection, storage, or restore trigger is typically required. The exact requirement depends on application authorization and operational controls.

Keep archive-derived values out of shell command strings, use structured process APIs with separated arguments, and validate all restore inputs against strict allowlists.

Treat backup archives as untrusted input, isolate restoration workers, apply least privilege, review process-execution paths, and enforce automated checks for unsafe command construction.

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