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CVE-2026-53866

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Authorization Bypass (CWE-862) in OpenClaw Shell Parser

CVE-2026-53866

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Privilege Abuse and Unauthorized Command Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenClaw contains an authorization bypass in its shell inline-command parsing that lets authenticated operators run commands without passing the intended allowlist checks.

By crafting requests that follow a specific inline-command format, an operator can trigger a parser path that skips approval prompts, resulting in execution of unapproved shell content.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in OpenClaw deployments that:

  • Expose shell or inline-command capabilities to authenticated operators
  • Rely on an allowlist or approval workflow to restrict which commands may be executed
  • Use a parser that treats inline-command syntax differently from standard command requests

It manifests when certain inline-command forms are parsed through logic branches that do not consistently enforce the configured allowlist decisions or approval prompts.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Management or operator interface that accepts shell inline-commands
  • Required access: Valid authenticated operator account with access to the shell/command feature
  • Trigger point: Submitting a command using the specific inline-command form that is routed through the under-enforced parser case
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parser includes a control-flow path where the allowlist/authorization check is not invoked or not applied consistently, allowing commands to bypass intended approval controls

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an authorization logic gap mapped to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where certain code paths fail to enforce required permission checks.

OpenClaw's shell inline-command parser treats different syntactic forms via separate branches, but at least one branch does not call the central allowlist decision or approval mechanism.

As a result, requests that match this inline-command pattern are allowed to proceed to shell execution without undergoing the same policy evaluation as standard commands, creating an inconsistent and unsafe authorization model.

Potential impact

  • Authenticated operators could execute shell commands that would normally be disallowed by policy
  • Bypass of approval or review workflows intended to gate sensitive command execution
  • Escalation of operational impact, such as altering system configuration, manipulating data, or triggering risky maintenance actions
  • Increased risk of insider abuse or misuse of privileged tooling

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on centralizing and enforcing authorization checks across all command paths.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Applying a single, reusable authorization/allowlist function that all parser branches must call before command execution
  • Designing command parsing so that syntax variations converge into a normalized representation that is validated once
  • Implementing "deny by default" behavior for any command forms not explicitly covered by policy
  • Separating command construction from execution, ensuring that policy decisions are made on the final, normalized command rather than intermediate representations
  • Limiting shell-capable features to the least set of roles and privileges required for operations

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect similar authorization gaps by:

  • Performing code review focused on ensuring every command-execution path invokes the same authorization/allowlist routine
  • Using static analysis rules that flag command execution APIs not preceded by explicit authorization checks
  • Implementing runtime logging that records which commands were executed, through which interface, and whether an approval or allowlist decision was applied
  • Periodically reviewing logs for commands that appear unapproved or inconsistent with configured policies
  • Employing automated policy enforcement tools that verify all control-flow paths to sensitive actions pass through the required guard functions

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-f397-5vjw-v2c2
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-allowlist-bypass-in-shell-inline-command-parsing

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, but only through interfaces that expose the shell inline-command capability. An attacker must first authenticate as an operator and then craft commands using the affected inline syntax.

Exploitation requires an authenticated operator account with permission to submit shell or inline-commands. The vulnerability allows that operator to exceed the usual policy constraints or approval workflow, but does not grant access to unauthenticated users.

The safest pattern is to centralize command authorization so that all command execution paths—regardless of syntax—must pass through a single, mandatory allowlist or approval function. Ensure that the parser normalizes input and then applies a "deny by default" policy if no explicit rule grants permission.

Future prevention relies on designing authorization as a shared service that cannot be bypassed: mandate guard functions on every sensitive action, avoid duplicating policy logic in multiple branches, enforce code-review checklists for access control, and use automated checks or tests to verify that every command execution route includes a corresponding authorization decision.

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