Summary
OTRS Community Edition contains an authenticated OS command injection vulnerability in its PGP encryption module. An administrator who can configure the PGP binary path or command options may cause arbitrary operating-system commands to run as the web server process user during normal ticket operations.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in OTRS deployments that use the PGP encryption module and allow an administrator to configure the PGP binary path or command options. Risk exists when these administrator-controlled values are incorporated into shell commands without adequate separation, validation, or escaping before ticket-related processing invokes the command.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: PGP encryption processing within the OTRS web application
- Required access: Authenticated administrative access capable of changing PGP-related configuration
- Trigger point: A normal ticket operation that invokes the configured PGP command
- Why exploitation is possible: Configuration values are concatenated into a shell command without sufficient sanitization, allowing command syntax supplied through those values to be interpreted by the operating system
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is the construction of a shell command by directly concatenating administrator-controlled configuration values. When untrusted or insufficiently constrained input is passed through a command interpreter, shell metacharacters and command syntax may be interpreted as executable instructions rather than ordinary data.
This behavior maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as OS command injection. The insecure pattern is trusting configurable executable paths or options while invoking them through a shell without using structured process-execution APIs and strict allowlisting.
Potential impact
- An attacker with administrative access could execute arbitrary operating-system commands
- Commands could run with the privileges of the OTRS web server process
- Application data, tickets, credentials, or configuration could be accessed or modified
- The OTRS host could be used for persistence, disruption, or lateral movement
- Ticket-processing workflows could be disrupted or manipulated
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on preventing configuration values from becoming shell syntax.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using structured process-execution APIs that avoid shell interpretation
- Treating executable paths and command options as separate, typed arguments
- Applying strict allowlists for permitted binaries and supported options
- Validating configuration values at entry and again immediately before use
- Reducing administrative privileges and limiting who can change PGP settings
- Running the web application with only the filesystem and operating-system permissions it requires
- Avoiding unnecessary exposure of sensitive configuration and cryptographic material
- Preserving audit records for security-sensitive configuration changes and command invocations
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules for shell invocation APIs and string concatenation involving configuration values
- Code review checks for command construction using administrative or request-derived input
- Searching for shell-enabled process execution where structured argument arrays are feasible
- Monitoring changes to PGP binary paths and command options
- Reviewing web server process activity for unexpected child processes or unusual command arguments
- Enforcing policies that require allowlisted executables and prohibit shell interpretation for application configuration
- Using automated security review tools to identify command-injection patterns during development

