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CVE-2026-53561

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Improper Authentication (CWE-287) in Apache Hive SAML

CVE-2026-53561

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-287, CWE-305, CWE-345

Impact:

Unauthorized access and user impersonation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

CVE-2026-53561 is a high-severity improper authentication vulnerability in Apache HiveServer2 SAML bearer-token validation. In affected HTTP-mode SAML deployments, an unauthenticated network attacker may forge a bearer token, authenticate as an arbitrary Hive user, and obtain an authenticated HiveServer2 session.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Apache Hive 4.0.0 through 4.2.0 and later unreleased branches when HiveServer2 uses HTTP transport with native SAML authentication enabled. The affected service is the HiveServer2 HTTP endpoint, commonly /cliservice, including deployments where a reverse proxy such as Apache Knox forwards unauthenticated requests to HiveServer2. Deployments using Knox for SSO while HiveServer2 relies on LDAP or Kerberos are not affected by this specific issue.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible HiveServer2 HTTP endpoint
  • Required access: No Hive credentials, SAML identity-provider login, or signing-secret knowledge
  • Trigger point: Bearer-token authentication at the HiveServer2 /cliservice endpoint
  • Deployment condition: Native SAML authentication must be enabled with HTTP transport
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server does not properly establish the authenticity and integrity of the presented bearer token before creating an authenticated session

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authentication-validation failure in the SAML bearer-token path. HiveServer2 accepts token-derived identity information without sufficiently proving that the token was issued by a trusted identity provider and has not been altered. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, with related concerns involving insufficient authentication of an actor (CWE-305) and failure to validate the authenticity or integrity of data (CWE-345).

Potential impact

  • An attacker may authenticate as an arbitrary Hive user
  • An attacker could obtain an authenticated HiveServer2 session without valid credentials
  • Unauthorized users may access Hive services and data permitted to the impersonated identity
  • Attackers may execute queries or modify data within the impersonated user's authorization scope
  • Compromised sessions could enable follow-on activity against connected data infrastructure

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that every bearer token is cryptographically validated and bound to a trusted issuer before an authenticated session is created.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using strict, standards-compliant SAML token validation with trusted issuer and audience checks
  • Verifying signatures, validity periods, subject identity, and relevant token claims before authentication
  • Rejecting unsigned, malformed, replayed, or ambiguously identified tokens
  • Separating authentication responsibilities clearly between reverse proxies, SSO gateways, and HiveServer2
  • Applying least privilege to Hive identities and service accounts
  • Restricting network exposure of HiveServer2 HTTP endpoints and using authenticated proxy paths where appropriate
  • Maintaining a supported security-fixed software baseline through normal patch-management processes

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this issue through:

  • Static and dependency analysis focused on authentication-token validation paths
  • Code review signals such as identity extraction before signature verification or trust validation
  • Tests using malformed, unsigned, expired, wrong-audience, and wrong-issuer tokens
  • HTTP access-log review for successful HiveServer2 sessions that lack a corresponding legitimate identity-provider event
  • Monitoring for unusual user impersonation, unexpected query activity, or session creation from untrusted network locations
  • Policy enforcement requiring cryptographic validation and explicit issuer, audience, and time-bound claim checks

Automated security review tools may help identify incomplete authentication flows, but deployment-specific testing remains important.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/apache/hive
github.comgithub.com/apache/hive/commit/6ca06ca1104ff7462363087a867d70d546134774
issues.apache.orgissues.apache.org/jira/browse/HIVE-29653
lists.apache.orglists.apache.org/thread/6d56mk501fp4f8cb5wvrpj2jwd9knt05

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker generally needs only network reachability to the HiveServer2 HTTP endpoint when native SAML authentication is enabled in HTTP mode.

No. The described condition does not require Hive credentials, a SAML identity-provider login, or knowledge of the server signing secret.

Deployments using HiveServer2's native SAML authentication over HTTP are in scope. Environments where Knox performs SSO and HiveServer2 uses LDAP or Kerberos are not affected by this specific issue.

Ensure bearer tokens undergo complete cryptographic and claims validation before session creation, keep the service on a security-fixed software baseline, restrict endpoint exposure, and enforce least privilege for Hive users.

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