Summary
Termix incorrectly includes global password-reset artifacts in exports intended to be limited to the authenticated user's data. A low-privileged authenticated user may recover another local account's reset code and take over that account, potentially gaining administrative control.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Termix deployments where the database export endpoint produces user-scoped exports but also includes records from the global settings table. The affected settings may contain password-reset codes or temporary reset tokens, creating risk when a low-privileged authenticated user can request and read an export.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated web access to the database export endpoint
- Required access: A valid low-privileged Termix user account
- Trigger point: Generation and retrieval of a database export
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization boundaries are not consistently applied to global settings data, allowing password-reset artifacts belonging to other local accounts to be disclosed
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization scope failure. An endpoint intended to return user-scoped data also includes a globally shared settings table without verifying whether each record is appropriate for the requesting user. This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, because access control checks do not adequately restrict sensitive data to the identities and scopes permitted by policy.
Potential impact
- A low-privileged user may recover another local account's password-reset artifacts
- An attacker could take over a targeted local account
- Administrative accounts could be compromised
- An attacker may gain access to SSH management, tunneling, file editing, or other privileged platform capabilities
- Compromised accounts could be used for further service or infrastructure abuse
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization consistently across every record included in an export.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting exports to data explicitly owned by or authorized for the requesting user
- Excluding password-reset codes, temporary tokens, and other authentication secrets from export results
- Applying deny-by-default authorization checks to global and shared settings
- Using short-lived, single-use reset artifacts that are securely stored and not returned through user-facing APIs
- Separating administrative exports from ordinary user exports and requiring explicit privileged access
- Running authorization and data-scope tests for every export and reporting endpoint
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for export queries that combine user-scoped and global tables
- Review signals involving missing owner, tenant, role, or permission predicates on sensitive data queries
- Tests that verify low-privileged users cannot retrieve other users' records or authentication artifacts
- API policy enforcement that classifies reset tokens and credentials as non-exportable secrets
- Audit logging and monitoring for unusual export activity or repeated access to account-recovery data
Automated security review tools may help identify endpoints whose response schemas contain sensitive fields outside the caller's authorization scope.

