Summary
A SQL injection flaw in migration-planner allows malicious SQL embedded in RVTools .xlsx spreadsheet cells to be executed when cluster names are processed.
An authenticated remote attacker who can upload crafted RVTools files may leverage this to read arbitrary files on the server, potentially exposing Kubernetes service account tokens and other sensitive credentials, which can enable full SaaS environment compromise.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in migration-planner deployments that ingest RVTools .xlsx files and use spreadsheet cell content (such as cluster names) in downstream SQL queries.
It is relevant where uploaded data is treated as trusted and is interpolated into database queries without robust sanitization or parameterization.
The risk is highest in multi-tenant SaaS setups where the application server has access to sensitive filesystem paths and Kubernetes-related credentials.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Application endpoint or workflow that accepts RVTools
.xlsxuploads for processing. - Required access: Valid authenticated access with permission to upload or import RVTools data into migration-planner.
- Trigger point: Processing of cluster names or related fields from the uploaded spreadsheet into SQL queries.
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled spreadsheet cell values are incorporated into SQL statements without proper escaping or the use of parameterized queries, enabling attackers to alter query logic and invoke file-read capabilities exposed via the database or database extensions.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a classic SQL injection bug where untrusted input is concatenated directly into SQL query strings.
During the RVTools import process, cell values such as cluster names are treated as benign data but are embedded into query text without using bind parameters or strict validation.
This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, where the application fails to neutralize meta-characters (such as quotes, delimiters, or control keywords) and thus allows attackers to modify the intended query semantics.
Potential impact
- Reading arbitrary files accessible to the database or application process, including configuration files and credentials.
- Exposure of Kubernetes service account tokens and related secrets.
- Discovery of internal network configuration, database schemas, and operational logs.
- Use of stolen tokens and credentials to pivot and potentially achieve full compromise of the SaaS environment.
- Escalation from a single tenant's account to broader systemic access, depending on isolation controls.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on treating imported spreadsheet data as untrusted and ensuring strict separation between data and query logic.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations involving user-supplied values, including data imported from files.
- Applying robust input validation and normalization on RVTools fields (e.g., enforcing character whitelists for cluster names).
- Implementing least-privilege for database accounts so they lack capabilities such as reading arbitrary filesystem paths or accessing sensitive system catalogs.
- Segmenting sensitive secrets and tokens away from the application server's direct filesystem access where feasible.
- Applying defense-in-depth controls such as application-level allowlists for file access if database features support file operations.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect this class of issue and its exploitation attempts through a combination of code-centric and operational measures:
- Static application security testing (SAST) to flag dynamic SQL construction that concatenates imported values from spreadsheets into query strings.
- Code review checklists that explicitly require parameterized queries for all data ingestion paths, including bulk import and migration utilities.
- Runtime monitoring of database logs for anomalous queries containing unexpected keywords (e.g.,
LOAD_FILE, file path literals, or system table references) originating from the RVTools import workflow. - Web application firewall (WAF) or API gateway rules tuned to detect SQL meta-characters and patterns in uploaded content or derived metadata fields.
- Periodic security assessments focusing on file-import and ETL-style features, supported by automated scanning tools that simulate hostile payloads in uploaded documents.

