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CVE-2026-53470

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.6)

IDOR Access Control Flaw (CWE-639) in migration-planner

CVE-2026-53470

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Unauthorized Data Access and Account Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An improper access control issue in migration-planner's /api/v1/sources/{id}/image-url endpoint allows authenticated users to bypass ownership checks by manipulating the source ID.

Under these conditions, an attacker can obtain presigned S3 URLs for other tenants' OVA images, exposing sensitive configuration data and long-lived JWTs that may enable further unauthorized access and modification of victims' sources.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in deployments of migration-planner that expose the /api/v1/sources/{id}/image-url API to authenticated users.

It is relevant where:

  • Multiple users or tenants manage OVA-based "sources" through the application
  • The endpoint relies on a user-supplied id path parameter without sufficiently enforcing ownership or tenancy boundaries
  • OVA images stored in S3 contain sensitive artifacts such as long-lived agent JWTs and source configuration data

When these conditions coincide, one tenant can request image URLs for resources that belong to another tenant.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application's HTTP API, specifically GET /api/v1/sources/{id}/image-url (or equivalent verb).
  • Required access: Valid authenticated account on the migration-planner instance; no special privileges beyond basic access to the endpoint.
  • Trigger point: Supplying an id value that refers to a source owned by another user or tenant.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server authorizes access based on authentication alone and does not robustly verify that the requesting principal owns or is permitted to access the sources/{id} resource, leading to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (CWE-639).

Why this happens

This is an authorization logic flaw where direct object references are exposed via predictable or discoverable identifiers without proper ownership checks.

The backend handler for /api/v1/sources/{id}/image-url accepts an id parameter and proceeds to generate a presigned S3 URL for the corresponding OVA image.

Instead of scoping the lookup to the current user or tenant and enforcing a strict resource-ownership relationship, the code implicitly trusts that any authenticated caller is allowed to access any valid id.

This pattern matches CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, a common form of IDOR where the application fails to couple object access to a robust authorization decision.

Potential impact

  • Exposure of OVA images belonging to other users or tenants
  • Disclosure of long-lived agent JWTs embedded within downloaded OVA images
  • Unauthorized access to, and potential control over, victims' "source" environments configured in migration-planner
  • Use of stolen tokens to impersonate agents or services and escalate privileges in connected systems
  • Lateral movement across tenant boundaries and compromise of migration workflows or associated infrastructure

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening authorization checks around direct object references and reducing the sensitivity of stored artifacts:

  • Enforce per-user or per-tenant ownership checks whenever accessing /sources/{id} resources, ensuring queries always scope by both principal and object identifier.
  • Centralize authorization logic so that resource access decisions are made through a consistent policy mechanism rather than ad-hoc checks spread across handlers.
  • Avoid embedding long-lived secrets such as agent JWTs directly within OVA images; prefer short-lived tokens or bootstrapping mechanisms that can be rotated and revoked.
  • Design presigned URL generation so that it only occurs after a robust authorization decision and ensures minimal lifetime and scope for the generated URL.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to backend services and data stores so that compromise of one component does not trivially grant access to all tenant resources.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level analysis with behavioral monitoring:

  • Use static analysis and code review to flag patterns where user-controlled identifiers (path parameters, query parameters, or body fields) are used to look up resources without scoping by the authenticated principal.
  • In reviews, look for endpoints that generate presigned URLs or access sensitive storage objects and verify that they call a centralized authorization layer that checks ownership or tenant membership.
  • Configure application logging to record access to /api/v1/sources/{id}/image-url, including requester identity and id values, and monitor for unusual patterns such as sequential or cross-tenant ID access.
  • Employ automated security testing (e.g., DAST or API fuzzers) that attempts ID enumeration and IDOR exploitation across all object-based endpoints.

Sources

SourceLink
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53470
bugzilla.redhat.combugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2487069
github.comgithub.com/kubev2v/migration-planner/pull/1218

Frequently asked

questions

Any authenticated user who can call the /api/v1/sources/{id}/image-url endpoint may be able to exploit the flaw by supplying identifiers for sources they do not own, making it broadly exploitable within a given deployment.

No special roles are required beyond having a valid account with access to the endpoint; the core issue is missing or insufficient ownership enforcement, not privilege level.

Implement strict, centralized authorization checks that always tie object access to the authenticated principal's identity or tenant and ensure that every endpoint using an object ID validates both existence and ownership before returning any data or generating presigned URLs.

Adopt a defense-in-depth approach where resource identifiers are always evaluated through a consistent authorization layer, perform regular security reviews targeting IDOR patterns, and design APIs so that direct object references are coupled with context-aware access control policies rather than relying solely on authentication.

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