Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Command Injection in DefaultFuction CMS tools.php

CVE-2026-5333

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on the Server

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

DefaultFuction Content-Management-System 1.0 contains a command injection vulnerability in /admin/tools.php where the host parameter is passed into system-level commands without proper sanitization.

A remote attacker can exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary commands on the server by sending crafted requests, potentially leading to full compromise of the underlying system.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the administrative tooling functionality of DefaultFuction CMS 1.0, specifically within /admin/tools.php.

It manifests when user-controlled input from the host parameter is used as part of backend command execution workflows, such as connectivity checks or diagnostic utilities, without robust escaping or argument handling.

The issue is most relevant where the CMS is exposed over the network and the tools.php endpoint is reachable, particularly if authentication is weak or misconfigured.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP requests to the /admin/tools.php endpoint of DefaultFuction CMS 1.0.
  • Required access: Ability to send requests that influence the host parameter; this may be via an authenticated admin panel or, if exposed, via unauthenticated access depending on deployment.
  • Trigger point: Server-side logic that composes and executes system commands using the host parameter, such as ping, traceroute, or other network diagnostics.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application interpolates raw host input into a shell command or equivalent execution primitive without strict validation, quoting, or safe argument construction, enabling attackers to inject additional shell metacharacters and commands.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from constructing operating system commands using untrusted input from the host parameter and executing them directly on the server.

Instead of treating host as data, the application allows it to influence the structure of the command line, which aligns with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

In some implementations this is combined with CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, where untrusted data is forwarded to a lower-level component (a shell or OS command) without proper encoding or argument separation.

The unsafe pattern is building command strings by concatenation and passing them to generic execution functions, rather than using safe APIs that separate code from data.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary operating system commands under the web server or application user account.
  • Theft, modification, or deletion of application data and configuration.
  • Installation of backdoors, webshells, or other persistent malware on the server.
  • Use of the compromised server as a pivot point for lateral movement within the network.
  • Disruption of service availability through destructive or resource-exhausting commands.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct command construction from user-controlled input and reducing the impact of any residual issues.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Replacing shell command invocation with dedicated library functions or APIs (e.g., native DNS, ping, or network libraries) that do not invoke a shell.
  • If command execution is unavoidable, using parameterized execution primitives that pass arguments as arrays instead of concatenating strings, and strictly validating host against an allowlist of expected formats (such as domain names or IP addresses).
  • Applying rigorous input validation and normalization for host, rejecting values containing shell metacharacters, control characters, or unexpected whitespace.
  • Running the CMS under a minimally privileged OS account and isolating it using process-level sandboxing, containers, or mandatory access controls to limit the blast radius of any compromise.
  • Restricting access to /admin/tools.php via strong authentication, network access controls, or disabling unused administrative tools by default.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection generally combines static inspection of the codebase with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis rules that flag concatenation of user inputs (like host) into command execution functions (e.g., exec, system, popen, shell_exec, or similar APIs).
  • Code review checklists that highlight any usage of shell commands in administrative tools and require justification, input validation, and safe argument handling.
  • Configuration and policy checks that ensure administrative endpoints, such as /admin/tools.php, are access-controlled and not exposed publicly by default.
  • Runtime monitoring and logging to detect unusual command patterns, unexpected processes spawned by the web server, or anomalous parameters supplied to /admin/tools.php.
  • Use of web application firewalls or request inspection tools configured with rules for common command injection indicators, while not relying on them as the sole line of defense.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/DefaultFuction/Content-Management-System/
github.comgithub.com/DefaultFuction/Content-Management-System/issues/1
github.comgithub.com/DefaultFuction/Content-Management-System/issues/1#issue-4082558620
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/780849
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/354667
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/354667/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The vulnerability is triggered over HTTP through the /admin/tools.php endpoint, so an attacker who can reach this endpoint and control the host parameter can attempt remote exploitation.

It depends on how the CMS is deployed. If /admin/tools.php is protected by authentication and access controls, an attacker would typically need valid credentials or another way to bypass authentication. If it is exposed without proper protection, exploitation could be possible without authentication.

The safest approach is to remove direct shell command usage for host-based operations and replace it with high-level language APIs or libraries. Where commands must remain, use argument-safe execution APIs, strict allowlist validation for host, and avoid any string-based command concatenation.

Adopt secure coding practices that prohibit building shell commands from user input, enforce input validation standards, and include automated checks in CI pipelines to flag dangerous command execution patterns. Additionally, regularly review administrative tools for unnecessary exposure and privilege, and design them with least-privilege and minimal functionality in mind.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.