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CVE-2026-52868

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

Path Traversal (CWE-22) in Medical Worklist Storage

CVE-2026-52868

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Unauthorized Data Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An unauthenticated path traversal issue in the medical worklist storage layer allows attackers to read records from directories outside the intended per-AE data area.

In multi-area deployments, misdirected file access can expose worklists across departments or clinics, breaking logical data separation and confidentiality boundaries.

Affected context

This vulnerability typically surfaces in systems that store worklists in filesystem directories partitioned by application entity (AE) or clinic/department.

It is most relevant where:

  • File paths are constructed from external identifiers or request parameters
  • Per-AE directory boundaries are enforced in code rather than by the OS
  • Multiple clinics or departments share the same underlying storage hierarchy

In such setups, insufficient path validation can let one logical area read files from another.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-facing service or API that serves worklist records from the filesystem
  • Required access: Ability to issue unauthenticated or minimally authenticated requests that influence which worklist directory or file is read
  • Trigger point: File lookup logic that concatenates user-controlled input with base paths and uses it to access worklist files
  • Why exploitation is possible: The system does not adequately normalize and constrain requested paths, allowing traversal outside the intended per-AE directory scope

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

Application logic relies on string concatenation or weak checks (such as simple prefix matching) to enforce per-AE directory boundaries.

Without robust normalization and enforcement of allowed paths, crafted inputs (e.g., containing relative segments or unexpected identifiers) can cause the file access routines to resolve to directories outside the intended worklist storage area.

This design trusts path-like input too much and fails to anchor file operations to a strictly controlled set of locations.

Potential impact

  • Unauthenticated reading of worklist records belonging to other AEs
  • Cross-department or cross-clinic exposure of scheduling and patient-related metadata
  • Violation of regulatory and privacy requirements (e.g., medical data segregation policies)
  • Increased risk of profiling clinic operations based on observed worklists
  • Potential use of exposed data to aid further targeted attacks

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on strict path handling and storage isolation:

  • Resolve all file accesses through canonical, normalized paths and reject any request that attempts to navigate outside an allowed base directory
  • Use indirect identifiers (e.g., database keys or AE IDs mapped server-side) rather than raw path fragments supplied by clients
  • Enforce a clear mapping from AE or clinic identifiers to fixed, non-user-controllable storage locations
  • Apply least-privilege filesystem permissions so the application account cannot read unrelated directories, even if traversal is attempted
  • Consider using higher-level storage abstractions (databases or object stores) instead of exposing direct filesystem path selection in business logic

How teams detect issues like this

Detection usually combines code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis rules that flag concatenation of user-controlled input into file paths, especially where .. segments or absolute paths may be interpreted
  • Code review checklists that require verification of path normalization, whitelists of allowed base directories, and AE-to-directory mappings
  • Configuration and policy audits to ensure application accounts do not have broad read access across shared storage hierarchies
  • Runtime monitoring or logs that record atypical path access patterns (e.g., requests resolving outside expected per-AE directories)
  • Integration of automated security scanning tools that specialize in path traversal and file access misuse patterns

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/DCMTK/dcmtk/releases/tag/latest
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsma-26-181-01.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-medical-advisories/icsma-26-181-01

Frequently asked

questions

In environments where multiple clinics or departments share the same storage backend, exploitation can extend across areas, allowing an attacker to read worklists from other logical tenants. In single-area setups, impact is typically limited to that deployment.

Based on the description, exploitation can be unauthenticated if the exposed interface accepts path-influencing parameters without verifying user identity. In more restricted configurations, very low-privilege access may still suffice.

Anchor all file operations to a vetted base directory and use server-side mappings from AE or clinic identifiers to storage locations, coupled with strict path normalization and rejection of any request that attempts to leave the permitted directory tree.

Standardize on secure file access patterns (normalized paths, whitelists, and indirect object references), enforce least-privilege filesystem permissions, and include path traversal checks in security reviews, automated static analysis, and test suites for all components that interact with storage paths.

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