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CVE-2026-52801

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Input Validation Flaw (CWE-20) in Gogs Mirror Settings

CVE-2026-52801

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Input Validation

CWE:

CWE-20

Impact:

Unauthorized Repository and Filesystem Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A missing input validation issue in Gogs' Mirror Settings allows authenticated users to import local repositories using an insufficiently protected pathway.

When mirror addresses are not properly validated, users may gain unintended access to local repositories and underlying filesystem content, creating a high-risk scenario in self-hosted Git deployments.

Affected context

This vulnerability exists in Gogs instances that expose the Mirror Settings feature to authenticated users.

It is triggered when mirror configuration data, especially repository addresses, are accepted and processed without adequate validation in the SaveAddress function.

The risk is elevated in deployments where the Gogs server has access to sensitive local repositories or filesystem paths that were intended to be shielded behind stricter migration workflows.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP interface for managing mirror settings within Gogs.
  • Required access: Any authenticated user account capable of configuring or editing mirror repositories.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted mirror address or configuration value that references local repositories or filesystem paths.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The SaveAddress function does not sufficiently validate or constrain the mirror target, allowing import of local repositories through a less protected code path than the New Migration functionality.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an instance of improper input validation, aligning with CWE-20.

The SaveAddress function responsible for handling mirror configuration data trusts the supplied address and does not enforce the same constraints or checks as the well-guarded migration mechanism.

As a result, users can specify values that point to local repositories or paths, bypassing intended protections and expanding access beyond what the design anticipates.

Potential impact

  • Authenticated users may import and access local repositories that were not meant to be exposed.
  • Attackers could gain visibility into internal project history and source code stored on the server.
  • Sensitive configuration files or internal tooling repositories can be unintentionally exposed.
  • The Gogs server's filesystem could be mapped into the application in ways that aid reconnaissance or further compromise.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening validation and enforcing strict trust boundaries around repository addresses.

Common patterns include:

  • Restricting mirror targets to approved protocols, domains, or remote endpoints rather than arbitrary local paths.
  • Reusing the same validation routines and policy checks used by the more secure migration functionality.
  • Introducing server-side checks that reject addresses pointing to local filesystem resources or internal-only repositories.
  • Applying least-privilege principles so the application's runtime account has limited filesystem access, reducing the blast radius if validation fails.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically relies on reviewing configuration handling and repository import workflows.

Helpful approaches include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag unvalidated inputs flowing into repository access or filesystem APIs.
  • Code review practices focused on ensuring all user-controllable repository addresses pass through shared validation layers.
  • Logging and monitoring of mirror creation or updates, with alerts for suspicious targets such as local file paths or unexpected hostnames.
  • Periodic audits of repository lists and mirror configurations to identify entries that reference local or sensitive resources.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/gogs/gogs/commit/11e19f28b5c82466fd1689c94344ef4313ee986c
github.comgithub.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8225
github.comgithub.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3
github.comgithub.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-wv27-2vqp-j7g5

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation is limited to authenticated users, but any user with access to mirror configuration can potentially abuse the flaw, making it broadly exploitable inside multi-user Gogs instances.

The attacker needs a valid Gogs account with the ability to manage or configure mirror settings; no elevated privileges are inherently required beyond that capability.

Apply strict input validation on mirror addresses, align validation with the protections used in migration functionality, and block references to local repositories or filesystem paths that should remain internal.

Centralize validation logic for all repository import mechanisms, enforce uniform policy checks across features, and include tests and code review rules that ensure no new path bypasses these controls.

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