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CVE-2026-52723

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Improper Certificate Validation (CWE-295) in ePA 3.x

CVE-2026-52723

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Certificate Validation

CWE:

CWE-295

Impact:

Man-in-the-Middle, Confidentiality Loss, and Traffic Manipulation

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

ePA 3.x Integration contains an improper certificate validation flaw in its VAU server authentication workflow. A network-positioned attacker may impersonate the VAU server, establish attacker-controlled session keys, and read or modify encrypted traffic when independent trust anchors and TLS verification are absent.

Affected context

The issue occurs in deployments using the affected ePA 3.x Integration authorization workflow to communicate with Germany's electronic patient record system. Risk is present when VAU server certificate data is validated through a circular trust relationship without independent trusted material, and when the underlying TLS certificate verification layer is disabled.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network communication between the DiGA backend and the ePA system
  • Required access: A position capable of intercepting and altering traffic on that communication path
  • Trigger point: VAU handshake and server-certificate validation
  • Why exploitation is possible: The implementation does not independently anchor the signed VAU server public keys and certificate path, while disabled TLS verification removes an additional authentication boundary

Why this happens

The underlying bug is improper certificate validation, mapped to CWE-295. The implementation accepts certificate and key material based on a circular trust relationship rather than validating the server identity against independently trusted anchors. Disabling TLS certificate verification further permits an on-path party to present forged server credentials and influence the negotiated session keys.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could impersonate the VAU server
  • Encrypted VAU traffic may be decrypted or exposed
  • Medical information objects could be read or modified
  • Authorization workflows could be manipulated
  • Backend communications could be redirected or selectively altered

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on establishing an independent server-authentication boundary.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Anchoring certificate validation to independently trusted, securely managed material
  • Enabling strict TLS certificate and hostname verification
  • Rejecting missing, expired, mismatched, or untrusted certificate chains
  • Avoiding circular trust decisions in authentication protocols
  • Limiting backend network privileges and restricting outbound communication paths
  • Protecting trust stores and key material from unauthorized modification
  • Treating encrypted traffic as untrusted until peer authentication succeeds

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis for disabled TLS verification and permissive certificate callbacks
  • Code review of certificate-chain construction and trust-anchor selection
  • Tests using invalid, expired, mismatched, and attacker-signed certificates
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected certificate subjects, issuers, or key changes
  • Policy enforcement requiring independent trust anchors for service-to-service authentication
  • Automated security review tools that flag certificate validation bypasses and trust-on-first-use patterns

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/fbeta-GmbH/ePA3-Service-OpenSource/commit/197c8c7fc41675f19c7f448696a2bc63fab9db5b
github.comgithub.com/fbeta-GmbH/ePA3-Service-OpenSource/pull/12
github.comgithub.com/fbeta-GmbH/ePA3-Service-OpenSource/releases/tag/1.3.0
github.comgithub.com/fbeta-GmbH/ePA3-Service-OpenSource/security/advisories/GHSA-q2jw-6c4w-86jc
machinespirits.demachinespirits.de/advisory/a1da93

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker generally needs a network position that allows interception and modification of traffic between the DiGA backend and the ePA system.

Not necessarily. Network interception capability may be sufficient if the handshake accepts attacker-controlled certificate and key material.

Require strict TLS verification and validate VAU server certificates against independent, securely managed trust anchors.

Test negative certificate cases, prohibit verification bypasses through policy and code review, protect trust stores, and continuously monitor service identity changes.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.