Summary
The MitraStar GPT-2741GNAC-N2-SV router contains an OS command injection vulnerability in ping diagnostics and similar functions. An authenticated user may execute arbitrary operating-system commands by sending crafted parameters to the affected device-management endpoint.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in router diagnostic functionality exposed through the
/cgi-bin/device-management-utilities-internet.cgi endpoint. Deployments may be
at risk when an authenticated user can access the relevant POST operation and
supplied parameters are incorporated into system commands without adequate
separation or validation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The router's HTTP device-management interface
- Required access: Valid authentication sufficient to reach the diagnostic functionality
- Trigger point: A crafted POST request to the affected CGI endpoint
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled parameters are concatenated into operating-system commands, allowing command syntax to alter the intended execution
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an OS command injection flaw, mapped to CWE-78.
The application constructs a system command by concatenating request-controlled
values with trusted command text. Without strict separation between data and
executable arguments, shell or command interpreter metacharacters may change
the command's meaning and cause unintended operating-system execution.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the router service
- Device configuration, credentials, or operational data could be exposed
- Network traffic may be disrupted or redirected
- The router could be used to access other systems on the local network
- Persistent compromise or denial of service could occur
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from diagnostic
operations and reducing trust in request parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Calling operating-system APIs with fixed executables and separated argument arrays rather than concatenated command strings
- Allowing only narrowly defined diagnostic actions and validating parameters against strict type, range, and format rules
- Avoiding shell-capable interfaces when a direct library or system API is available
- Applying least privilege to management and diagnostic processes
- Restricting management access to trusted administrative networks and enforcing strong authentication
- Treating all web-request parameters as untrusted, including values submitted by authenticated users
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules that identify shell execution APIs receiving concatenated request data
- Code review checks for string interpolation or concatenation near process-spawning functions
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes launched by the router's web or CGI service
- Web-application policy controls that restrict access to management endpoints and flag anomalous diagnostic requests
- Automated security review tools that trace user-controlled data into command-execution sinks

