Summary
SuperAGI's agent-execution endpoint may return the latest execution and agent metadata for a project belonging to another organization. An authenticated attacker may access this information by supplying a victim project ID when authorization is not properly scoped to the caller's organization.
SuperAGI's agent-execution endpoint may return the latest execution and agent metadata for a project belonging to another organization. An authenticated attacker may access this information by supplying a victim project ID when authorization is not properly scoped to the caller's organization.
Affected context
The issue is described in get_agent_by_latest_execution in superagi/controllers/agent_execution.py, exposed through /agentexecutions/get/latest/agent/project/{project_id}. It may affect deployments where the endpoint accepts a project ID without verifying that the authenticated user's organization is authorized to access that project.
The issue is described in get_agent_by_latest_execution in superagi/controllers/agent_execution.py, exposed through /agentexecutions/get/latest/agent/project/{project_id}. It may affect deployments where the endpoint accepts a project ID without verifying that the authenticated user's organization is authorized to access that project.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible latest-agent-execution endpoint
- Required access: An authenticated account in an organization
- Trigger point: A request to the endpoint using a project ID associated with another organization
- Why exploitation is possible: The project identifier may be used to retrieve execution and agent metadata without an effective organization-level authorization check
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible latest-agent-execution endpoint
- Required access: An authenticated account in an organization
- Trigger point: A request to the endpoint using a project ID associated with another organization
- Why exploitation is possible: The project identifier may be used to retrieve execution and agent metadata without an effective organization-level authorization check
Why this happens
The underlying issue is improper access control: authorization may not be enforced against the requested project's organization before returning its data. This maps to CWE-284, which covers failures to restrict access to resources according to the caller's permissions. Treating possession of a project ID as sufficient authority is an insecure access-control pattern.
The underlying issue is improper access control: authorization may not be enforced against the requested project's organization before returning its data. This maps to CWE-284, which covers failures to restrict access to resources according to the caller's permissions. Treating possession of a project ID as sufficient authority is an insecure access-control pattern.
Potential impact
- An authenticated user may be able to view another organization's latest execution metadata
- Agent or project details could be exposed across organizational boundaries
- Disclosure may support further targeting of affected projects or organizations
- An authenticated user may be able to view another organization's latest execution metadata
- Agent or project details could be exposed across organizational boundaries
- Disclosure may support further targeting of affected projects or organizations
General mitigation guidance
Defensive patterns include enforcing authorization on every request and scoping resource lookups to the authenticated user's organization. Treat project IDs as identifiers, not proof of permission, and return only data the caller is authorized to access. Prefer deny-by-default authorization, consistent tenant isolation, and least-privilege access to execution metadata.
Defensive patterns include enforcing authorization on every request and scoping resource lookups to the authenticated user's organization. Treat project IDs as identifiers, not proof of permission, and return only data the caller is authorized to access. Prefer deny-by-default authorization, consistent tenant isolation, and least-privilege access to execution metadata.
How teams detect issues like this
- Review endpoint handlers and data-access paths for authorization checks performed before returning project or execution data.
- Use static analysis or code review to identify resource lookups based on caller-supplied identifiers without tenant scoping.
- Test authorization policies with accounts from separate organizations and verify cross-tenant requests are denied.
- Monitor for requests where a user accesses project IDs outside their organization, subject to privacy and logging policies.
- Review endpoint handlers and data-access paths for authorization checks performed before returning project or execution data.
- Use static analysis or code review to identify resource lookups based on caller-supplied identifiers without tenant scoping.
- Test authorization policies with accounts from separate organizations and verify cross-tenant requests are denied.
- Monitor for requests where a user accesses project IDs outside their organization, subject to privacy and logging policies.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| gist. | gist.github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |

