Summary
A critical incorrect access control vulnerability in RAGFlow's trace_mindmap functionality may allow an externally reachable request to access data associated with a caller-selected object or tenant identifier. The issue becomes risky when the endpoint does not verify ownership, tenant membership, workspace access, or another authorization relationship before performing the data-access operation.
A critical incorrect access control vulnerability in RAGFlow's trace_mindmap functionality may allow an externally reachable request to access data associated with a caller-selected object or tenant identifier. The issue becomes risky when the endpoint does not verify ownership, tenant membership, workspace access, or another authorization relationship before performing the data-access operation.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects RAGFlow deployments exposing the trace_mindmap functionality through an externally reachable interface. It may be present where request-supplied object or tenant identifiers are accepted and passed to data-access logic without a corresponding authorization check that binds the requested resource to the authenticated caller's tenant, workspace, ownership, or membership context.
The vulnerability affects RAGFlow deployments exposing the trace_mindmap functionality through an externally reachable interface. It may be present where request-supplied object or tenant identifiers are accepted and passed to data-access logic without a corresponding authorization check that binds the requested resource to the authenticated caller's tenant, workspace, ownership, or membership context.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Externally reachable trace_mindmap request path
- Required access: Ability to reach the endpoint; authentication requirements may depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: A request that supplies or influences an object or tenant identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The selected identifier can reach a data-access operation without a visible authorization binding to the caller
- Attack surface: Externally reachable trace_mindmap request path
- Required access: Ability to reach the endpoint; authentication requirements may depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: A request that supplies or influences an object or tenant identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The selected identifier can reach a data-access operation without a visible authorization binding to the caller
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization design failure in which resource selection is treated as sufficient proof of access. The application appears to accept a caller-controlled object or tenant identifier and perform a lookup without enforcing an ownership, tenant, workspace, or membership relationship. This behavior maps to CWE-284, Incorrect Access Control, because access decisions are not consistently enforced at the point where protected data is retrieved.
The underlying bug is an authorization design failure in which resource selection is treated as sufficient proof of access. The application appears to accept a caller-controlled object or tenant identifier and perform a lookup without enforcing an ownership, tenant, workspace, or membership relationship. This behavior maps to CWE-284, Incorrect Access Control, because access decisions are not consistently enforced at the point where protected data is retrieved.
Potential impact
- An attacker may access data belonging to another object, tenant, or workspace.
- Confidential information could be disclosed across authorization boundaries.
- An attacker could use returned data to support further account or tenant compromise.
- Cross-tenant isolation could be weakened, depending on deployment and data-access behavior.
- An attacker may access data belonging to another object, tenant, or workspace.
- Confidential information could be disclosed across authorization boundaries.
- An attacker could use returned data to support further account or tenant compromise.
- Cross-tenant isolation could be weakened, depending on deployment and data-access behavior.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the data-access
boundary rather than trusting caller-supplied identifiers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving tenant, workspace, and ownership context from the authenticated session where possible.
- Applying object-level authorization checks for every requested resource.
- Enforcing tenant and membership predicates in repository or query-layer operations.
- Using deny-by-default policies for missing, ambiguous, or mismatched authorization context.
- Limiting endpoint exposure and applying least-privilege service and database identities.
- Avoiding response differences that disclose whether unauthorized resources exist.
- Testing cross-tenant and cross-workspace isolation as part of application security validation.
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the data-access
boundary rather than trusting caller-supplied identifiers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving tenant, workspace, and ownership context from the authenticated session where possible.
- Applying object-level authorization checks for every requested resource.
- Enforcing tenant and membership predicates in repository or query-layer operations.
- Using deny-by-default policies for missing, ambiguous, or mismatched authorization context.
- Limiting endpoint exposure and applying least-privilege service and database identities.
- Avoiding response differences that disclose whether unauthorized resources exist.
- Testing cross-tenant and cross-workspace isolation as part of application security validation.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review rules that flag direct use of request identifiers in data queries without nearby authorization checks.
- Review of trace_mindmap handlers, service methods, and repository functions for explicit tenant, workspace, ownership, or membership enforcement.
- Dynamic tests that submit valid identifiers belonging to other users or tenants and verify consistent denial behavior.
- API policy checks requiring authenticated identity and resource-scope validation before protected data access.
- Logging and monitoring for repeated identifier changes, cross-tenant access attempts, and authorization-denied events.
Automated code review and API security testing tools may help identify missing object-level authorization patterns.
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review rules that flag direct use of request identifiers in data queries without nearby authorization checks.
- Review of trace_mindmap handlers, service methods, and repository functions for explicit tenant, workspace, ownership, or membership enforcement.
- Dynamic tests that submit valid identifiers belonging to other users or tenants and verify consistent denial behavior.
- API policy checks requiring authenticated identity and resource-scope validation before protected data access.
- Logging and monitoring for repeated identifier changes, cross-tenant access attempts, and authorization-denied events.
Automated code review and API security testing tools may help identify missing object-level authorization patterns.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| gist. | gist.github.com/ |
