Summary
DB-GPT v0.8.0 has a sandbox API that can silently fall back to LocalRuntime instead of maintaining isolated execution. When this fallback is triggered, submitted code may execute directly on the host rather than inside the intended sandbox.
DB-GPT v0.8.0 has a sandbox API that can silently fall back to LocalRuntime instead of maintaining isolated execution. When this fallback is triggered, submitted code may execute directly on the host rather than inside the intended sandbox.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in DB-GPT v0.8.0 deployments that expose or otherwise invoke the sandbox API while relying on its runtime-selection behavior for isolation. Risk increases when the API is reachable by untrusted users or networks and the fallback runtime has access to sensitive host resources.
The vulnerability occurs in DB-GPT v0.8.0 deployments that expose or otherwise invoke the sandbox API while relying on its runtime-selection behavior for isolation. Risk increases when the API is reachable by untrusted users or networks and the fallback runtime has access to sensitive host resources.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: DB-GPT sandbox API and its runtime-selection path
- Required access: Ability to submit code or execution requests to the affected API; the CVSS rating indicates a potentially network-reachable, low-complexity scenario
- Trigger point: A sandbox execution request that causes the API to select LocalRuntime
- Why exploitation is possible: The API can silently substitute a host-backed runtime for the intended isolated environment, allowing submitted code to execute with the permissions of the DB-GPT process
- Attack surface: DB-GPT sandbox API and its runtime-selection path
- Required access: Ability to submit code or execution requests to the affected API; the CVSS rating indicates a potentially network-reachable, low-complexity scenario
- Trigger point: A sandbox execution request that causes the API to select LocalRuntime
- Why exploitation is possible: The API can silently substitute a host-backed runtime for the intended isolated environment, allowing submitted code to execute with the permissions of the DB-GPT process
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization and isolation failure: the sandbox API does not reliably enforce the security boundary promised by its interface. Instead of failing closed when the isolated runtime is unavailable or unsuitable, it falls back to LocalRuntime without clearly rejecting the request or requiring an explicitly trusted configuration. This behavior maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because execution is permitted outside the intended authorization and containment boundary.
The underlying bug is an authorization and isolation failure: the sandbox API does not reliably enforce the security boundary promised by its interface. Instead of failing closed when the isolated runtime is unavailable or unsuitable, it falls back to LocalRuntime without clearly rejecting the request or requiring an explicitly trusted configuration. This behavior maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because execution is permitted outside the intended authorization and containment boundary.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code on the DB-GPT host
- The application process may expose credentials, files, or environment data
- Host and connected service integrity could be compromised
- The attacker could move laterally into dependent systems or workloads
- Data may be modified, deleted, or exfiltrated
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code on the DB-GPT host
- The application process may expose credentials, files, or environment data
- Host and connected service integrity could be compromised
- The attacker could move laterally into dependent systems or workloads
- Data may be modified, deleted, or exfiltrated
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing isolation as a mandatory security property and preventing transparent fallback to a less trusted runtime.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Fail closed when the sandbox runtime cannot be created or verified
- Require explicit administrative configuration before any host-backed runtime is usable
- Separate sandbox execution identities from application and host identities
- Apply least privilege, filesystem restrictions, network egress controls, and resource limits to execution workers
- Treat submitted code and execution parameters as untrusted input
- Expose runtime selection and isolation status clearly in logs and API responses
- Keep sensitive credentials and host interfaces unavailable to execution environments where possible
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing isolation as a mandatory security property and preventing transparent fallback to a less trusted runtime.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Fail closed when the sandbox runtime cannot be created or verified
- Require explicit administrative configuration before any host-backed runtime is usable
- Separate sandbox execution identities from application and host identities
- Apply least privilege, filesystem restrictions, network egress controls, and resource limits to execution workers
- Treat submitted code and execution parameters as untrusted input
- Expose runtime selection and isolation status clearly in logs and API responses
- Keep sensitive credentials and host interfaces unavailable to execution environments where possible
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis and code review signals involving fallback from isolated runtimes to local or host execution
- Tests that deliberately make the sandbox unavailable and verify that requests are rejected rather than redirected
- Policy checks requiring explicit approval for local execution providers
- Runtime logs showing sandbox requests handled by LocalRuntime
- Process, file, and network monitoring for unexpected child processes or host resource access by DB-GPT workers
- Automated security review tools that flag fail-open authorization and isolation decisions
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis and code review signals involving fallback from isolated runtimes to local or host execution
- Tests that deliberately make the sandbox unavailable and verify that requests are rejected rather than redirected
- Policy checks requiring explicit approval for local execution providers
- Runtime logs showing sandbox requests handled by LocalRuntime
- Process, file, and network monitoring for unexpected child processes or host resource access by DB-GPT workers
- Automated security review tools that flag fail-open authorization and isolation decisions
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| gist. | gist.github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
