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CVE-2026-51744

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Broken Access Control (CWE-284) in TOTOLINK T6 MQTT

CVE-2026-51744

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Unauthorized Mesh Configuration Synchronization

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical access-control vulnerability in the TOTOLINK T6 allows unauthenticated network attackers to trigger mesh configuration synchronization from an attacker-controlled host through the cs_broker component. The issue becomes risky when the MQTT service accepts crafted synchronization messages without verifying the sender or enforcing authorization.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the recv_mesh_info_sync function of TOTOLINK T6 4.1.5cu.748_B20211015 when mesh configuration synchronization is exposed through the cs_broker MQTT component. Risk depends on network reachability of the broker, whether authentication is enforced, and whether synchronization messages are processed without validating their source or authorization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: MQTT communication handled by the cs_broker component
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the exposed MQTT service; authentication may not be required
  • Trigger point: Processing of a crafted mesh synchronization message by recv_mesh_info_sync
  • Why exploitation is possible: The synchronization request is accepted without adequate authorization or source validation, allowing an attacker-controlled host to initiate the operation

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization failure in a security-sensitive mesh management operation. The implementation permits a synchronization request to reach recv_mesh_info_sync without establishing that the requester is an authorized mesh peer or administrator. This behavior maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, where access restrictions are missing or insufficient for a protected function.

Potential impact

  • An unauthenticated attacker may force unauthorized mesh configuration synchronization
  • Network devices could accept configuration data originating from an attacker-controlled host
  • Mesh integrity could be altered or configuration could be overwritten
  • Device connectivity or availability could be disrupted
  • Compromised mesh settings could enable further network reconnaissance or lateral movement

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the point where mesh synchronization requests are accepted.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require authenticated and authorized mesh peers for synchronization operations
  • Validate message origin, device identity, freshness, and integrity before processing
  • Use secure-by-default MQTT access controls, including authenticated clients and topic-level authorization
  • Reduce exposure of broker and management interfaces to trusted network segments
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to services that process or apply mesh configuration
  • Reject synchronization requests when peer identity or authorization cannot be established

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review of MQTT handlers for missing authentication and authorization checks
  • Review of mesh synchronization paths for trust decisions made solely from message content
  • Network monitoring for unexpected synchronization topics, unauthenticated broker clients, or messages from non-mesh hosts
  • Policy enforcement requiring authentication, topic restrictions, and network segmentation for device-management protocols
  • Security testing that verifies unauthorized clients cannot invoke configuration-management operations
  • Neutral automated code-review tools that flag externally reachable handlers lacking explicit access-control checks

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/DarkBoulder/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
github.comgithub.com/ShengWu00/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md
totolink.nettotolink.net/
totolink.nettotolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/190/ids/36.html

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. It may be remotely exploitable when the device's MQTT service is reachable by an attacker and accepts synchronization messages without requiring authentication or authorization.

The described issue allows unauthenticated access, so a valid account may not be required. Network reachability and exposure of the relevant MQTT component remain necessary conditions.

Require authenticated, authorized mesh peers and verify message integrity, origin, and freshness before allowing configuration synchronization.

Treat all MQTT management messages as untrusted, enforce topic- and operation-level authorization, segment management services, and test that unauthenticated clients cannot invoke sensitive device functions.

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