Summary
Sismics Docs (Teedy) v1.11 contains an access control flaw in its share-based read endpoints that can allow unauthorized users to reach sensitive resources through crafted HTTP requests.
When these endpoints do not reliably enforce authorization checks, attackers may retrieve documents or metadata they are not supposed to see, especially in environments that rely heavily on shared links.
Affected context
This weakness appears in Sismics Docs (Teedy) deployments that expose share-based read endpoints to users or external networks.
It is most relevant where shared links or tokens are used as a primary mechanism for granting read access to documents or collections.
The issue arises when endpoints trusting such shares do not sufficiently verify that a requestor is entitled to access the associated resource, especially when requests can be replayed or modified.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) share-based read endpoints of the Teedy application
- Required access: Network connectivity to the Teedy instance; no valid user account or share token may be required if the flaw is present
- Trigger point: Sending a crafted or manipulated request to a share-based read endpoint
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint performs incomplete or incorrect authorization checks, allowing requests that should be rejected to succeed and return protected data
Why this happens
The root cause is an implementation-level access control error that maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control.
Instead of consistently enforcing authorization rules on every share-based read request, the affected endpoints rely on insufficient checks, such as trusting a share identifier or request parameter without robust verification.
This pattern often occurs when business logic assumes that possession of a link or identifier is equivalent to authorization, rather than validating the caller's privileges or binding the share to specific conditions.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized users can access documents or files intended for restricted audiences
- Exposure of sensitive metadata such as document titles, tags, or ownership information
- Leakage of internal or confidential business records stored in the document system
- Increased risk of data harvesting and enumeration of shared resources
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strong, consistent authorization checks on all share-based endpoints.
Recommended design patterns include:
- Applying a centralized authorization layer that evaluates each request against resource-specific permissions
- Binding share-based access to scoped, time-limited, and revocable tokens with clearly defined privileges
- Validating both the share token and the context (such as user identity, IP restrictions, or intended resource) before returning any data
- Implementing least-privilege defaults so that endpoints deny access when any authorization ambiguity exists
- Logging and monitoring access to shared resources to detect misuse or anomalous access patterns
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves a combination of code-level and runtime analysis:
- Static analysis: Rules that flag endpoints bypassing centralized authorization or directly returning resources based on weak conditions (for example, only checking for the presence of an ID parameter)
- Code review: Focused review of controller or route handlers managing share-based access, ensuring they invoke standard permission checks and do not special-case logic that skips controls
- Security testing: Manual or automated tests that attempt to access shared resources without valid tokens, with modified identifiers, or from unauthenticated sessions to observe whether data is returned
- Policy enforcement: Architectural policies requiring that all external-facing endpoints be wired through a common authorization middleware or service, and automated verification that no routes are exempted

