Summary
An incorrect access control vulnerability in Deck9 Input v2.0.1 allows authenticated users to modify or delete webhook configurations belonging to other tenants via the /{form}/webhooks/{webhook} endpoint.
When multi-tenant isolation relies solely on weak or missing authorization checks, crafted requests can bypass tenant boundaries and tamper with cross-tenant webhook settings.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in multi-tenant deployments of Deck9 Input v2.0.1 where multiple customers share the same backend.
It manifests at the /{form}/webhooks/{webhook} HTTP endpoint responsible for managing webhook definitions.
The issue arises when tenant scoping or ownership checks are incomplete or loosely enforced, allowing requests authorized for one tenant to be applied to another tenant's webhook resources.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated HTTP API access to
/{form}/webhooks/{webhook} - Required access: Valid user account or API token for any tenant in the system
- Trigger point: Sending a crafted request targeting a webhook identifier or form belonging to a different tenant
- Why exploitation is possible: The server-side authorization logic does not reliably confirm that the caller owns the targeted webhook resource or that it belongs to their tenant, enabling cross-tenant modification or deletion.
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an authorization design weakness mapped to CWE-284: Improper Access Control.
The application exposes a multi-tenant management endpoint for webhooks but does not consistently verify ownership and tenant association before performing state-changing operations.
This often stems from relying on client-supplied identifiers (such as {form} or {webhook} path parameters) without binding them to the authenticated user's tenant context, or from using generic role checks without object-level permission enforcement.
Potential impact
- An attacker can modify another tenant's webhook URLs, secrets, or event filters.
- An attacker can delete another tenant's webhook, disrupting integrations and event processing.
- An attacker can reroute events to an endpoint they control, potentially exfiltrating or observing sensitive event data.
- An attacker can cause denial of service for targeted tenants by breaking their automation and notification flows.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict, server-side authorization at the resource level.
Useful patterns include:
- Implementing object-level access control that checks tenant ownership for every operation on
/{form}/webhooks/{webhook}. - Binding resource identifiers (form IDs, webhook IDs) to the authenticated user's tenant context on the server, ignoring tenant-related data supplied by clients.
- Centralizing authorization logic so that create/read/update/delete operations all share consistent tenant and ownership checks.
- Applying least privilege principles, ensuring tokens and roles grant only the minimal set of webhook operations required for a given tenant.
- Designing APIs so that cross-tenant references are impossible or rejected by default, with safe-by-default access control configurations.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection commonly involves both preventive and retrospective techniques:
- Static analysis and code review focusing on endpoints that manipulate shared or multi-tenant resources, verifying object-level authorization checks.
- Security test cases or automated integration tests that attempt cross-tenant operations (e.g., modifying resources with identifiers belonging to another tenant).
- Logging and monitoring for anomalies, such as webhook changes initiated by principals outside the owning tenant, and alerting on suspicious cross-tenant patterns.
- Use of policy enforcement frameworks or middleware that require explicit tenant ownership validation for all resource-modifying endpoints.

