Summary
A high-severity certificate validation flaw in ePA 3.x Integration disables TLS certificate verification for electronic patient record and Konnektor connections. A network-positioned attacker may impersonate either endpoint, intercept sensitive ePA traffic, and observe client certificate exchanges and smartcard-related operations.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in ePA 3.x Integration deployments that establish connections to ePA services or Konnektors while TLS certificate verification is disabled. Affected connection paths include the VAU protocol handling and Konnektor sessions, where application-layer certificate validation may also fail to provide effective protection. Risk depends on an attacker being able to position themselves between the client and the remote service.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: TLS connections from the ePA integration to ePA or Konnektor endpoints
- Required access: Network positioning sufficient to intercept and alter connection traffic
- Trigger point: TLS session establishment and subsequent application communication
- Why exploitation is possible: The client accepts arbitrary server certificates, allowing an attacker to impersonate the intended endpoint and terminate the encrypted session
- Additional condition: The Konnektor client certificate may be exchanged with the impersonating endpoint during mutual TLS authentication
Why this happens
The underlying bug is improper certificate validation, mapped to CWE-295. The integration explicitly disables TLS certificate verification for important outbound sessions instead of establishing trust in the intended server certificate or trusted issuer. Because the VAU application's additional certificate validation is also ineffective in affected paths, the application layer does not reliably compensate for the missing TLS protection. This creates a trust-on-first-connection pattern in which a network intermediary can present an arbitrary certificate.
Potential impact
- An attacker may decrypt and inspect ePA traffic.
- An attacker could modify requests or responses exchanged with the remote service.
- Sensitive medical information may be exposed.
- An attacker may impersonate a Konnektor and observe client certificate exchanges.
- Smartcard-related operations could be disclosed or manipulated.
- Unauthorized actions may be performed through an intercepted session.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on restoring strong endpoint authentication and
reducing the trust placed in network-provided certificates.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Enabling certificate and hostname verification for every TLS connection.
- Using a narrowly scoped, explicitly managed trust store rather than accepting arbitrary certificates.
- Ensuring application-layer certificate checks are independently correct and fail closed.
- Avoiding transmission of client certificates until the remote endpoint has been authenticated.
- Protecting private keys and smartcard interfaces with least-privilege access controls.
- Preventing configuration or environment settings from silently disabling TLS verification.
- Applying network segmentation and restrictive egress policies as defense-in-depth controls.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:
- Static analysis searches for disabled TLS verification, such as false-valued verification settings or permissive certificate callbacks.
- Code review checks for HTTP client sessions that accept untrusted certificates or omit hostname validation.
- Tests using invalid, expired, mismatched, and attacker-controlled certificates to verify fail-closed behavior.
- Policy enforcement that prohibits insecure TLS configuration in production code and deployment settings.
- Network monitoring for unexpected certificate issuers, endpoint changes, or TLS interception indicators.
- Automated security review tools that flag certificate-validation bypass patterns.

