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CVE-2026-50570

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

Privilege Misconfiguration (CWE-269) in Fission Pods

CVE-2026-50570

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Privilege Management / Authorization

CWE:

CWE-269, CWE-732

Impact:

Elevation of Privilege via Excess Capabilities

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A privilege misconfiguration in Fission's PodSpec safety validation allows tenant-created functions or environments to run with the CAP_SYS_TIME Linux capability.

Under multi-tenant Kubernetes deployments where tenants can define Function or Environment CRDs, this can let attacker-controlled code adjust system time in its container or node, undermining security controls.

Affected context

The issue arises in Fission-based, Kubernetes-native serverless platforms where:

  • Tenants are allowed to create or modify Environment and Function Custom Resources
  • PodSpec safety validation relies on a denylist-based capability filter
  • Runtime containers inherit Linux capabilities directly from tenant-specified securityContext

In these contexts, omitted capabilities like CAP_SYS_TIME can slip through validation, granting broader privileges than intended.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Fission's tenant-facing Environment and Function CRDs exposed via Kubernetes API
  • Required access: Ability for a tenant or attacker to create or edit Function/Environment CRDs in a target namespace
  • Trigger point: Submission of a PodSpec (or container securityContext) that adds CAP_SYS_TIME to capabilities
  • Why exploitation is possible: The admission webhook and merge-layer sanitization use a fixed capabilities denylist, failing to block CAP_SYS_TIME and potentially other powerful capabilities, so they are propagated into the final function container.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from a privilege enforcement design that uses an explicit denylist of "disallowed" Linux capabilities instead of defining a minimal allowed set.

Because CAP_SYS_TIME and other capabilities were not included in the denylist, tenant-specified securityContext.capabilities.add could request them and still pass the ValidatePodSpecSafety / ValidateContainerSafety admission checks.

This aligns with CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management) and CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource), as the system grants more privileges than necessary to untrusted tenant workloads.

Potential impact

  • Tenant functions may adjust system time inside their container, potentially impacting time-sensitive logic or logging.
  • On some environments, CAP_SYS_TIME may influence node-level time settings, disrupting cluster services and time-based security controls.
  • Attackers could manipulate time-based authentication tokens, session expiration, or audit trails, complicating incident response.
  • Misconfigured or overly permissive nodes could experience broader integrity and reliability issues due to time skew.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening capability management and reducing trust in tenant-supplied PodSpecs:

  • Prefer allowlists of safe Linux capabilities rather than denylists of dangerous ones.
  • Enforce strict, centralized policies for container securityContext, ensuring that tenants cannot escalate capabilities beyond a minimal baseline.
  • Use admission controls and policy engines (e.g., PodSecurity standards, PSP replacements, or policy-as-code) to constrain securityContext and capabilities for all tenant workloads.
  • Adopt least-privilege principles for serverless runtimes and avoid granting time, network, or kernel-level capabilities unless there is a clearly justified need.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine policy enforcement, configuration review, and runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis and policy-as-code tools can flag Kubernetes manifests or CRDs that request privileged capabilities like CAP_SYS_TIME.
  • Code review guidelines can require inspection of securityContext and capabilities in tenant-facing controllers and admission webhooks.
  • Cluster-wide policies (e.g., OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno) can log or deny pods that specify disallowed capabilities, providing an auditable trail.
  • Runtime security tools can monitor for containers running with unexpected capabilities or performing sensitive system time operations.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/fission/fission/pull/3465
github.comgithub.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.25.0
github.comgithub.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-qf5v-m7p4-95rp

Frequently asked

questions

It is exploitable via the Kubernetes control plane by anyone who can create or modify Fission Function or Environment CRDs, but not typically over a raw network socket; it relies on authenticated access to the cluster's API.

An attacker needs permissions equivalent to a Fission tenant: the ability to create or update Function or Environment custom resources in a namespace where Fission is configured to run workloads.

Move from a denylist of disallowed capabilities to an explicit allowlist of minimal, necessary capabilities, and centralize securityContext enforcement in admission controls or policy engines so tenant input cannot expand privileges.

Design multi-tenant systems around least privilege, treat tenant-supplied PodSpecs as untrusted, enforce Pod security via standardized policies, and regularly review capability and securityContext handling with security-focused code review and automated checks.

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