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CVE-2026-50191

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Pre-Account Takeover (CWE-287) in 4gaBoards SSO Login

CVE-2026-50191

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Pre-Account Takeover

CWE:

CWE-287, CWE-288

Impact:

Account Takeover and Unauthorized Data Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

4gaBoards can allow an attacker to create an unverified local account using another person's email address and later have a victim's SSO identity linked to that account. When registration and SSO options are enabled, the attacker may retain password access and obtain the victim's projects, data, and permissions.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in 4gaBoards deployments where local registration, SSO registration, and one or more supported SSO providers are enabled together. Risk is present when the application identifies accounts by email during the first SSO login without verifying that the existing local account was created or controlled by the same identity holder.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public account registration, token issuance, and SSO login endpoints
  • Required access: The ability to submit a registration request and authenticate with the resulting local account
  • Trigger point: The victim's first login through Google, GitHub, Microsoft, or OIDC SSO
  • Why exploitation is possible: An unverified local account can be created for the victim's email, and the SSO flow links the verified identity to that account without confirming ownership of the pre-existing local credentials

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an account-linking trust error. The application treats an email address as sufficient evidence that an unverified local account belongs to the SSO identity, even though the email was previously supplied by an unauthenticated registrant.

This maps primarily to CWE-287: Improper Authentication because ownership of the local account is not properly established before linking identities. It also relates to CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path, since the SSO account-linking path can bypass the normal proof required to associate credentials with an account.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may retain password-based access to the linked account
  • The attacker could access the victim's projects, data, and permissions
  • The attacker may modify project content or account settings
  • Compromised accounts could be used for unauthorized actions against other users or integrations

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on treating unverified local accounts and SSO identities as separate security principals until ownership is proven.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Requiring verified email ownership before permitting account linking
  • Requiring an authenticated session or explicit confirmation from the existing account owner before merging identities
  • Avoiding automatic account lookup and linking based solely on an email address
  • Disabling password authentication or local registration when those capabilities are not needed
  • Applying least privilege to newly registered and unverified accounts
  • Preserving strong identity-provider and session-boundary checks throughout the linking workflow

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Static analysis and code review findings where SSO handlers link accounts by email without an ownership or verification check
  • Registration flows that issue usable authentication tokens before email verification
  • Correlations between newly created local accounts and subsequent SSO identity-linking events
  • Account-linking policies that permit unverified credentials to remain active after an SSO merge
  • Automated tests covering pre-registration, first-time SSO login, duplicate email, and account-linking scenarios

Security review tools and CI policy checks can help identify identity flows that trust user-supplied email addresses without an independent verification step.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/RARgames/4gaBoards/commit/484c92d583cfbc6815f96364071bb531ec594bf8
github.comgithub.com/RARgames/4gaBoards/releases/tag/v3.3.8
github.comgithub.com/RARgames/4gaBoards/security/advisories/GHSA-f3p6-chc6-pc77

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The relevant registration, token, and SSO endpoints are application-facing, although exploitation depends on the deployment having the required registration and SSO settings enabled.

Not necessarily. The attack relies on registering an unverified local account with the victim's email before the victim completes an SSO login. The attacker may then retain the local password after identity linking.

Do not link an existing local account to an SSO identity based only on matching email addresses. Require verified ownership and explicit, authenticated confirmation before merging identities.

Model unverified accounts separately, limit their privileges, require verified email ownership, and test every account-linking path for alternate authentication and pre-account-takeover scenarios.

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