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CVE-2026-50189

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

SSRF to Supervisor RCE (CWE-918) in Appsmith Admin

CVE-2026-50189

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery to Remote Code Execution

CWE:

CWE-183, CWE-918

Impact:

Remote Code Execution within Application Container

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Appsmith prior to version 2.1 exposes a supervisord XML-RPC interface through its public ingress, allowing authenticated administrators to send arbitrary RPC calls into the container.

When combined with an exposed supervisor password, an attacker with admin access can execute OS commands inside the Docker container by creating and running programs via supervisord.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Appsmith deployments that:

  • Run versions prior to 2.1 with the bundled supervisord component
  • Expose the Caddy reverse-proxy route /supervisor/* on the public ingress
  • Allow administrators to retrieve environment variables through /api/v1/admin/env

In such configurations, the supervisor XML-RPC interface on port 9001 becomes reachable from outside the container using application endpoints, enabling indirect control of supervisord from the web UI.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP endpoints on the Appsmith public ingress (/supervisor/* and /api/v1/admin/env)
  • Required access: Authenticated administrator-level access to the Appsmith application
  • Trigger point: Issuing crafted XML-RPC calls to supervisord using the exposed route and valid supervisor password
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application's reverse proxy forwards external requests to an internal management service (supervisord) and divulges the necessary authentication secret, effectively turning an internal control channel into an externally triggerable interface.

Why this happens

The core issue is the exposure of an internal control interface (supervisord XML-RPC) through an externally accessible reverse-proxy route, combined with disclosure of its authentication credential via an admin API.

This aligns with CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) because the web application allows users to drive requests from the server to internal services that were not intended to be directly reachable.

Additionally, the system relies on weak separation between administrative configuration APIs and sensitive management-plane secrets, allowing a legitimate but overly powerful admin endpoint to leak credentials for a lower-level process controller.

Potential impact

  • An attacker with admin access may execute arbitrary OS commands inside the Appsmith Docker container.
  • They could install backdoors or additional tooling within the container filesystem.
  • They may access or modify application data and configuration stored locally.
  • They could pivot to other internal services reachable from the compromised container, depending on network topology.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on limiting exposure of internal management interfaces and tightening secret handling:

  • Avoid routing internal control channels (e.g., supervisord XML-RPC) through public reverse proxies unless strictly necessary, and restrict them to trusted networks.
  • Segregate management-plane credentials from general application configuration; do not expose process controller passwords via admin APIs.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to admin roles and interfaces, reducing the ability to trigger low-level system operations from high-level dashboards.
  • Use application-layer access controls and network policies to ensure that administrative HTTP endpoints cannot drive uncontrolled requests to internal services.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify and monitor similar issues by:

  • Reviewing reverse proxy and ingress configurations for routes that expose internal management or control interfaces.
  • Applying static or configuration analysis to detect endpoints that relay requests to internal services without adequate restriction.
  • Auditing admin APIs for secrets disclosure and validating that environment and configuration export endpoints omit sensitive credentials.
  • Monitoring logs for unusual use of /supervisor/* routes or unexpected supervisord RPC activity from web-facing paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/appsmithorg/appsmith/security/advisories/GHSA-v49v-673j-g4vj

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the Appsmith ingress is publicly reachable and the /supervisor/* route is exposed, an attacker with admin credentials can drive requests to supervisord from the internet.

No. They only need authenticated administrator access to the Appsmith web interface; actual OS command execution occurs via supervisord inside the container.

Remove or strictly restrict public exposure of internal management interfaces, avoid leaking their credentials through admin APIs, and ensure administrative HTTP routes cannot be used to invoke low-level process control.

Implement clear separation between user-facing and management-plane endpoints, treat internal services as sensitive assets, enforce strict access controls and network segmentation, and include proxy configuration and credential exposure checks in security reviews and CI pipelines.

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