Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Simple Food Order System all-tickets.php

CVE-2026-5017

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Manipulation via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Simple Food Order System 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /all-tickets.php parameter handler, where the Status parameter is used in database queries without proper sanitization.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to alter SQL queries, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting application data, especially when the application runs with overly broad database privileges.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in web deployments of Simple Food Order System 1.0 that expose the /all-tickets.php endpoint and pass the Status parameter into SQL queries.

It typically manifests when user-controlled request parameters are concatenated into SQL statements without parameterization or robust validation.

The risk is higher in environments where the database account used by the application has privileges beyond the minimum required for listing and updating ticket information.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface to /all-tickets.php
  • Required access: Remote web access to the vulnerable endpoint (authentication requirements depend on application configuration)
  • Trigger point: Supplying crafted values in the Status parameter so they reach the underlying SQL query construction logic
  • Why exploitation is possible: The Status value is incorporated directly into SQL statements without proper parameter binding or escaping, allowing attacker-controlled input to modify the query structure

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing SQL queries using string concatenation with untrusted input from the Status parameter in the /all-tickets.php parameter handler.

Instead of using prepared statements with bound parameters, the code likely embeds the raw parameter value directly into WHERE or ORDER BY clauses, allowing attacker input to be interpreted as part of the SQL syntax.

This aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, and is related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, because improperly sanitized data is forwarded to the database engine as executable commands.

Potential impact

  • Attacker may read sensitive data from ticket or related tables beyond what their role should access
  • Attacker could modify ticket records, including status, ownership, or associated user information
  • Attacker could delete or corrupt data, impacting order tracking and operational integrity
  • Attacker may escalate privileges by manipulating authentication or authorization-related tables, if present
  • Attacker could potentially run database-specific functions that aid in further compromise of the environment

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct use of untrusted input in SQL construction and reducing the impact of any residual injection risk:

  • Use prepared statements or parameterized queries for all interactions with the database, including filtering and sorting based on request parameters
  • Apply strict server-side validation and whitelisting for parameters like Status (e.g., allow only known status values or enums)
  • Separate query logic from user input by avoiding dynamic query fragments based on raw request data wherever possible
  • Enforce least-privilege on the database user account so it has only the minimal rights needed for ticket operations
  • Centralize database access patterns in a data access layer to ensure consistent use of secure query APIs across the application

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor for SQL injection patterns in several ways:

  • Use static analysis to flag string concatenation in SQL statements and identify unparameterized queries involving request parameters such as Status
  • During code review, look for direct inclusion of $_GET, $_POST, or similar variables in query strings within files like all-tickets.php
  • Apply application-level logging and monitoring for anomalous query patterns, such as unexpected SQL keywords appearing in parameter values
  • Use dynamic analysis or interactive security testing tools that attempt SQL injection payloads against web endpoints to identify exploitable paths
  • Enforce secure coding guidelines and linting rules that prohibit non-parameterized SQL in the codebase

Sources

SourceLink
code-projects.orgcode-projects.org/
github.comgithub.com/6Justdododo6/CVE/issues/15
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/779331
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/353902
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/353902/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The vulnerable endpoint /all-tickets.php is reachable over HTTP(S), and an attacker can exploit the issue by sending crafted requests with malicious Status parameter values, subject to whatever network and authentication controls are in place.

It depends on how the application is deployed. If /all-tickets.php is accessible without authentication, the attack can be fully unauthenticated; if it is behind a login, an attacker would need at least low-privileged access to send requests to the endpoint.

The safest pattern is to replace any string-built SQL using Status (or other request parameters) with prepared statements and bound parameters, combined with strict validation of Status against an allowlist of known, valid statuses, implemented in a centralized data access layer.

Adopt a standard practice of always using parameterized queries, enforce input validation on all externally supplied data, integrate secure coding checks and static analysis into the development pipeline, and include SQL injection checks in regular security testing and code review processes.

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