Summary
elecV2 elecV2P up to version 3.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw in the eAxios URL handler under /mock, allowing crafted req arguments to control where the server issues outbound HTTP requests.
An attacker who can reach the vulnerable endpoint over the network may coerce the server into making arbitrary backend requests, potentially reaching internal services that are not directly exposed to the internet.
Affected context
The vulnerability exists in the eAxios function of the /mock URL handler in elecV2P up to version 3.8.3.
It manifests when user-controlled request data is used to construct outbound HTTP requests without adequate validation or restriction of target URLs.
Deployments that expose the affected HTTP interface to untrusted clients, such as over the internet or to multi-tenant users, are more at risk than tightly controlled, internal-only setups.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The
/mockURL handler that routes through theeAxiosfunction. - Required access: Network access to the vulnerable endpoint (no assumption of prior authentication, unless the deployment restricts it).
- Trigger point: Supplying crafted
reqparameters that influence the destination of outbound HTTP calls. - Why exploitation is possible: The handler uses attacker-controlled request fields to build URLs or request options for server-side HTTP requests, without enforcing a safe allowlist or robust validation, enabling arbitrary or internal targets to be contacted.
Why this happens
This issue stems from inadequate validation of user-controlled input used to construct server-side HTTP requests, a classic instance of CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
The eAxios URL handler appears to trust the req argument to define remote endpoints or request parameters, forwarding them directly to an HTTP client.
Without strict constraints on destination hosts, protocols, or paths, the server becomes a proxy that attackers can steer toward internal services, metadata endpoints, or restricted network locations.
Conceptually, the insecure pattern is: "take a client-provided URL or connection details and issue a server-side request on its behalf, without enforcing a safe, minimal set of allowed destinations."
Potential impact
- May allow access to internal network services that are not directly exposed to the internet.
- Could enable interaction with cloud or platform metadata endpoints, potentially leading to credential or configuration disclosure.
- Can facilitate network scanning of internal hosts and ports from the perspective of the vulnerable server.
- May be combined with other weaknesses in internal services (e.g., misconfigured admin panels, debug endpoints) to escalate to data exfiltration or remote code execution.
- Could be used to bypass IP-based access controls or firewall rules that trust the server's network location.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation generally focuses on constraining where the server is allowed to connect and hardening how user input influences outbound requests:
- Introduce strict allowlists of permitted upstream hosts, domains, and protocols for any server-initiated HTTP requests.
- Normalize and validate user-controlled URLs or request parameters before use, rejecting or sanitizing unsafe schemes (e.g., non-HTTP(S) protocols) and disallowed hosts (e.g., localhost, link-local, RFC1918 ranges).
- Decouple user input from direct URL composition; map user input to pre-defined backend identifiers instead of free-form URLs.
- Apply least-privilege network design: segment sensitive internal services from application nodes that process untrusted input, and restrict egress traffic where feasible.
- Ensure server components running URL handlers do not have unnecessary network access to critical infrastructure or metadata services.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines code-level and operational approaches:
- Static analysis: Search for patterns where HTTP client libraries (e.g., Axios or equivalent) consume variables derived directly from HTTP request parameters, query strings, or JSON bodies as full URLs or host components.
- Code review: Flag handlers that expose "proxy", "mock", or "forward" capabilities and verify that they enforce allowlists, URL normalization, and protocol/host restrictions.
- Configuration and policy checks: Enforce security policies that require outbound-request components to define explicit allowed destinations and to reject requests targeting localhost or private addresses.
- Runtime monitoring: Instrument outbound HTTP calls to log destination hosts and detect anomalous patterns, such as frequent requests to internal IP ranges originating from endpoints accessible to untrusted users.

