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CVE-2026-50136

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Missing Auth on S3 URL Generator (CWE-306) in Budibase

CVE-2026-50136

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Cloud Storage Operations

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Budibase exposes an unauthenticated endpoint that generates S3 PutObject presigned URLs using workspace datasource credentials.

An attacker who knows a workspace ID and S3 datasource ID can obtain signed upload URLs for arbitrary buckets and keys, creating a high-risk path for unauthorized storage access and data manipulation.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Budibase application server deployments where:

  • S3 datasources are configured within workspaces
  • The presigned URL generation route is reachable from the public network
  • recaptcha middleware is used as the only protection for the endpoint

Under these conditions, the service may issue presigned S3 PutObject URLs without enforcing standard authentication or authorization checks on the caller.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public HTTP endpoint on the Budibase application server
  • Required access: Knowledge of a target workspace ID and associated S3 datasource ID
  • Trigger point: Calling the presigned URL generation route with attacker-chosen bucket and key parameters
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint relies solely on recaptcha middleware and does not enforce authentication, workspace membership, table permissions, or datasource access controls, allowing untrusted callers to leverage internal S3 credentials.

Why this happens

The underlying issue maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

A server-side route that performs a sensitive operation—creating S3 PutObject presigned URLs backed by trusted workspace credentials—is exposed without proper authentication or authorization gates. By treating presigned URL generation as a low-risk, captcha-protected action rather than a privileged function, the design implicitly grants storage capabilities to any caller who can reach the endpoint and provide minimal identifiers. This insecure pattern results from misclassifying the security sensitivity of helper APIs and failing to consistently apply identity and permission checks to data access flows.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized uploads to S3 buckets using workspace-bound credentials
  • Data pollution or overwriting of existing S3 objects where keys collide
  • Abuse of organization-managed storage for hosting arbitrary attacker content
  • Indirect compromise of application data integrity if S3-backed resources are consumed by Budibase apps
  • Potential stepping stone for further attacks that rely on trusted storage artifacts

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating presigned URL generation as a privileged capability and enforcing strict identity and access controls around it.

Useful patterns include:

  • Requiring authenticated user context and validating workspace membership before generating presigned URLs
  • Applying fine-grained authorization checks tied to datasource configuration and table-level permissions
  • Limiting which buckets, prefixes, and keys can be targeted based on trusted server-side configuration rather than user input
  • Centralizing access control logic so that all data-accessing routes consistently enforce authentication and permission policies
  • Reducing reliance on soft protections (like captchas) for operations that expose infrastructure credentials or powerful data primitives

How teams detect issues like this

Detection commonly relies on a mix of design review and technical controls:

  • Reviewing API specifications and server routes for endpoints performing sensitive actions without authentication or authorization checks
  • Static analysis or policy-as-code rules that flag handlers generating presigned URLs or accessing cloud credentials without preceding auth middleware
  • Logging and monitoring access to presigned URL generation endpoints, looking for anonymous or unusually frequent calls from untrusted origins
  • Continuous security testing of low-code platform APIs, including checks for undocumented or weakly protected helper endpoints

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-jj36-r9w3-3pfh

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the Budibase application server is exposed publicly and the presigned URL endpoint is reachable, an attacker can exploit it remotely by providing workspace and datasource identifiers.

No. The original behavior allows unauthenticated callers to request presigned S3 PutObject URLs, relying only on recaptcha rather than proper authentication and authorization checks.

Treat presigned URL generation as a privileged operation: require authenticated user context, validate workspace membership, enforce datasource permissions, and restrict bucket and key targets to trusted server-side configuration.

Adopt a consistent access-control model for all server routes, classify data-access helpers as sensitive by default, perform security design reviews for new APIs, and use automated checks to ensure that every endpoint invoking cloud credentials or presigned URLs is protected by robust authentication and authorization middleware.

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