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CVE-2026-49478

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.7)

SSRF (CWE-918) in Fulcio OIDC Cert Discovery Endpoint

CVE-2026-49478

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Blind SSRF, credential disclosure, and signing trust compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery vulnerability in Fulcio allows cross-host redirects during OIDC discovery to reach attacker-controlled or unintended endpoints. In affected deployments, Kubernetes ServiceAccount tokens may be attached to these requests, enabling token disclosure, malicious JWKS substitution, or blind SSRF when an issuer is malicious or compromised.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Fulcio deployments that perform OIDC discovery and follow redirects across host boundaries. It becomes risky when the discovery process can access Kubernetes-mounted ServiceAccount tokens, automatically inject those tokens into requests, or load token material from local paths without sufficiently restricting the destination and source.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Fulcio's OIDC discovery and JWKS retrieval process
  • Required access: The ability to control, compromise, or influence an OIDC issuer or its discovery responses
  • Trigger point: Redirect handling or token-assisted requests made during OIDC discovery
  • Why exploitation is possible: Cross-host redirects and insufficiently constrained token handling may cause Fulcio to contact attacker-controlled hosts or disclose Kubernetes ServiceAccount credentials

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is insufficient destination and credential-boundary enforcement in an OIDC discovery client. The client follows redirects to different hosts and may attach Kubernetes ServiceAccount tokens or load local token material without adequately verifying that the destination is trusted and in scope. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, because attacker-influenced URLs cause the server to make requests to unintended locations and may expose privileged request context.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may induce requests to internal or external systems through Fulcio
  • Kubernetes ServiceAccount tokens could be disclosed to external hosts
  • Malicious JWKS keys could be substituted or cached
  • OIDC trust decisions and certificate issuance could be influenced
  • Compromised tokens could enable further access within the cluster

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing strict network, redirect, and credential boundaries in OIDC clients.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Rejecting cross-host redirects by default
  • Allowing redirects only to explicitly trusted origins
  • Injecting ServiceAccount tokens only for approved destinations and request contexts
  • Restricting local token loading to narrowly defined, protected paths
  • Separating discovery requests from privileged runtime credentials where possible
  • Applying least-privilege permissions and network egress controls to Fulcio workloads
  • Validating and safely caching JWKS responses with issuer and origin binding

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect related risks through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks for HTTP clients that follow redirects without host validation
  • Searches for automatic credential or token injection in generic outbound request code
  • Review of local file reads used to obtain Kubernetes credentials
  • Network monitoring for Fulcio requests to unexpected hosts or external destinations
  • Policies requiring explicit allowlists for OIDC discovery and JWKS endpoints
  • Alerts for ServiceAccount tokens appearing in outbound request headers or logs

Automated security review tools may help identify redirect handling and sensitive-header propagation patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/sigstore/fulcio/commit/378c654f48c3bafdced04ead7010aab2cb4c6ca1
github.comgithub.com/sigstore/fulcio/pull/2354
github.comgithub.com/sigstore/fulcio/releases/tag/v1.8.6
github.comgithub.com/sigstore/fulcio/security/advisories/GHSA-f5mr-q85p-6hh6

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploitable through attacker-influenced or compromised OIDC issuer behavior, provided Fulcio can reach the issuer and process its discovery responses.

Direct host access is not necessarily required. The relevant prerequisite is the ability to influence the OIDC discovery or redirect behavior, along with a deployment that permits access to token material.

Reject cross-host redirects by default, restrict token injection to explicitly trusted destinations, and prevent discovery logic from accessing unnecessary local credentials.

Treat outbound identity-provider requests as security-sensitive, enforce origin allowlists, isolate signing services with least privilege and egress controls, and monitor for unexpected external requests or credential-bearing traffic.

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