Summary
A broken object-level authorization vulnerability in the NL Portal taak package allows an authenticated user to access and manipulate another resident's task by supplying its task ID to the submitTaakV2 GraphQL mutation. Depending on deployment and identifier predictability, an attacker may read form data, overwrite submitted information, or mark the task as completed without owning it.
Affected context
The issue occurs in NL Portal Backend Libraries deployments that expose the submitTaakV2 GraphQL mutation through the /graphql endpoint and rely on the submitted task ID without adequately verifying that the authenticated caller owns or is authorized to manage the referenced task. The risk is greater where task identifiers are predictable, discoverable, or exposed through other application behavior.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The
submitTaakV2GraphQL mutation - Required access: An authenticated NL Portal user account
- Required knowledge: A task ID belonging to another user, obtained or guessed through available application data
- Trigger point: Submission of a mutation referencing the unauthorized task
- Why exploitation is possible: The backend processes the object reference without consistently enforcing ownership or equivalent authorization for the authenticated user
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure. The mutation accepts a task identifier and performs operations on the referenced task, but the authorization decision does not reliably bind that object to the requesting user's identity or permitted organizational scope. This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, because a user-controlled identifier can select another user's object for read or state-changing operations.
Potential impact
- An attacker could read another user's task form data
- An attacker could overwrite submitted information
- An attacker could mark an unauthorized task as completed
- The vulnerability could cause workflow disruption or inaccurate government service records
- Sensitive resident, customer, supplier, or partner information may be exposed
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the object and operation level rather than trusting the supplied task ID.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Checking task ownership or explicitly granted access for every mutation
- Enforcing authorization server-side for reads, updates, and completion transitions
- Applying tenant, organization, and role boundaries consistently
- Avoiding reliance on identifier secrecy as an access control mechanism
- Limiting exposure of GraphQL endpoints and blocking or restricting the affected mutation where appropriate
- Using least-privilege service identities and separating read, update, and completion permissions
- Returning uniform errors and minimizing identifier disclosure
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for database lookups by user-controlled identifiers without adjacent authorization checks
- Review of GraphQL resolvers and service methods for ownership enforcement on every object operation
- Tests that attempt cross-user reads, updates, and state transitions using valid authenticated accounts
- API gateway policies that monitor or restrict sensitive mutations
- Authorization telemetry showing task access outside the caller's user, tenant, or organizational scope
- Automated security testing tools that support broken object-level authorization and GraphQL authorization testing

