Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Simple Laundry System Parameter Handler

CVE-2026-4908

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Integrity Compromise via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Simple Laundry System 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the /modstaffinfo.php Parameter Handler, where the userid parameter is used unsafely in database queries.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to inject arbitrary SQL, which may expose or alter application data when crafted input is processed by the backend.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the Simple Laundry System 1.0 web application within the /modstaffinfo.php script, specifically in the logic that handles the userid parameter for the Parameter Handler component.

It is present when user-supplied userid values received over HTTP are incorporated into SQL statements without proper parameterization, escaping, or validation, typically within authentication, staff information, or user lookup workflows exposed to remote clients.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal web interface exposing /modstaffinfo.php.
  • Required access: Ability to send HTTP requests to the application endpoint (no special privileges implied).
  • Trigger point: The application processes a request where the userid parameter is controlled by the attacker and passed into a SQL query.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The userid value is concatenated directly or indirectly into a SQL query string without using prepared statements or proper input handling, allowing crafted input to alter the query structure.

Why this happens

The underlying issue maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), and is related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component.

The code appears to treat the userid parameter as trusted and embeds it into SQL commands, likely by string concatenation or interpolation, without parameterized queries or sufficient neutralization.

As a result, database-control characters and SQL keywords from user input are interpreted by the database engine as part of the command rather than as data, enabling attackers to modify query logic.

Potential impact

  • May allow attackers to read sensitive information from database tables, including user or staff data.
  • Could permit modification or deletion of application data, affecting integrity of orders, accounts, or operational records.
  • Might enable creation of new accounts or elevation of privileges if the schema and logic allow.
  • Can be used to infer database structure and underlying technology through error-based or time-based probing.
  • In some environments, may facilitate further compromise of the hosting environment via database-level features or chained vulnerabilities.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally focuses on treating all external input as untrusted and enforcing strong separation between data and query logic:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions involving user input, including the userid parameter.
  • Apply strict server-side validation and normalization on identifier-like inputs (e.g., enforcing expected formats such as numeric IDs or constrained patterns).
  • Centralize database access patterns through a well-reviewed data access layer that discourages ad-hoc string-built SQL.
  • Limit database privileges for the application account to only the minimum operations required, reducing blast radius if injection occurs.
  • Consider using an ORM or query builder that defaults to safe parameter binding, while still reviewing for raw query escape hatches.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can approach detection through a combination of code-centric and behavior-centric methods:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag string concatenation or interpolation involving request parameters (like $_GET['userid'], $_POST['userid'], or framework equivalents) inside SQL execution calls.
  • Code review: During manual review, look for direct SQL strings built from global request variables or unvalidated parameters in files such as /modstaffinfo.php, and verify the consistent use of prepared statements.
  • Dynamic testing: Use automated or manual security testing tools to send crafted userid values and observe database error responses, timing differences, or anomalous behavior indicative of injection.
  • Runtime monitoring: Implement database and application logging policies that surface unusual or malformed SQL patterns correlated with specific HTTP requests for further investigation.

Sources

SourceLink
code-projects.orgcode-projects.org/
github.comgithub.com/Niuzzz123/CVE-Niuzzz/issues/2
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.353659
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.353659
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.777501

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The flaw can be triggered remotely by sending crafted HTTP requests to the /modstaffinfo.php endpoint, as long as it is reachable over the network.

Not necessarily. If the vulnerable functionality is accessible without authentication, anonymous attackers could exploit it; if it is behind a login, any account with access to that endpoint could potentially trigger the flaw.

The safest pattern is to refactor all affected database calls to use parameterized queries or prepared statements and to avoid building SQL by concatenating or interpolating user input such as userid.

Adopt secure coding standards that mandate parameterized queries, enforce rigorous input validation, use frameworks or ORMs with safe-by-default database APIs, and integrate static and dynamic security testing into the development lifecycle to catch injection patterns early.

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