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CVE-2026-48765

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

Broken Access Control (CWE-639) in TypeBot OAuth Credentials

CVE-2026-48765

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Cross-Workspace OAuth Credential Takeover

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

TypeBot versions before 3.17.0 contain an authorization flaw that lets a low-privilege read collaborator obtain an OAuth credential identifier from a readable bot configuration and modify the credential through an attacker-controlled workspace.

Successful exploitation may allow cross-workspace OAuth credential takeover and reassignment, potentially granting access to connected external services.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in TypeBot's OAuth credential update flow when a user can read a bot configuration containing a credential identifier and also control or write to a workspace accepted by the update handler. The affected path validates the supplied workspace but retrieves the credential by a globally unique identifier, creating a condition where authorization scope and credential ownership can become disconnected.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: TypeBot's OAuth credential update functionality
  • Required access: Low-privilege collaborator access that permits reading a bot configuration and supplying a writable workspace context
  • Trigger point: Processing by handleUpdateOAuthCredentials()
  • Required data: A readable OAuth credentialsId associated with a bot configuration
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks are applied to the attacker-supplied workspace, while the credential is updated by global id alone and can have its workspaceId rewritten

Why this happens

The underlying defect is an authorization boundary failure mapped to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The update operation treats a user-controlled workspace identifier as sufficient authorization, then performs the credential lookup using only a credential identifier that is not scoped to the authorized workspace.

Because the update also rewrites the credential's workspace association, an authorized operation in one workspace can affect a credential belonging to another workspace. This insecure pattern results from separating object identification from ownership validation rather than enforcing both constraints in the same authorization decision.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may take over OAuth credentials belonging to another workspace
  • Connected third-party services could be accessed or modified
  • Credential ownership and workspace isolation could be disrupted
  • Applications or integrations relying on the affected credentials may be impersonated
  • Sensitive data could be exposed through compromised OAuth connections

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the resource boundary and preventing user-controlled identifiers from bypassing ownership checks.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Scope credential lookups by both credential identifier and an independently established authorized workspace
  • Derive workspace context from the authenticated session and verified resource relationships rather than trusting request fields
  • Verify ownership and permission before every credential read, update, reassignment, or deletion
  • Prevent ordinary collaborators from changing credential ownership or workspace associations unless explicitly authorized
  • Use transactionally enforced relationship checks and database constraints where appropriate
  • Apply least privilege to workspace roles and OAuth integrations
  • Treat credential identifiers as sensitive references and avoid exposing them in broadly readable configuration data

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review rules that flag updates performed by global identifiers without tenant or workspace scoping
  • Review of handlers that accept workspace, tenant, owner, or organization identifiers from clients
  • Tests that attempt cross-workspace reads, updates, and ownership changes using low-privilege roles
  • Authorization policies requiring resource ownership checks before mutation
  • Audit logging and alerting for OAuth credential reassignment, unexpected workspace changes, and updates by read-only collaborators
  • Automated security review tools that identify missing object-level authorization checks

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/baptisteArno/typebot.io/commit/7ae4c007d0987d2ca907b47e1b7418db62b8a157
github.comgithub.com/baptisteArno/typebot.io/pull/2459
github.comgithub.com/baptisteArno/typebot.io/releases/tag/v3.17.0
github.comgithub.com/baptisteArno/typebot.io/security/advisories/GHSA-3788-7276-x4j4

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation can occur through TypeBot's application interfaces when the attacker has the required low-privilege collaborator access and can reach the vulnerable credential update path.

The attacker generally needs permission to read a bot configuration that exposes an OAuth credentialsId and access to a workspace context accepted as writable by the update operation.

Enforce authorization using the authenticated user's effective workspace permissions and verify that the target credential belongs to that workspace before allowing any update or reassignment.

Use tenant-scoped resource queries, avoid trusting client-supplied ownership fields, test cross-tenant authorization boundaries, and monitor sensitive credential ownership changes.

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