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CVE-2026-48751

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in Incus Snapshots

CVE-2026-48751

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Arbitrary Command Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical authorization flaw in Incus causes instance snapshots to bypass the restricted.containers.lowlevel=block restriction. An attacker who can create or manipulate affected snapshots may abuse low-level container or virtual machine hooks to execute arbitrary commands on the Incus server.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Incus environments that use restricted containers and rely on the restricted.containers.lowlevel=block setting to prevent low-level configuration. Before the relevant authorization behavior is enforced for instance snapshots, snapshot-related operations may permit settings such as raw.lxc or raw.qemu to reach the host-side management path.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Incus instance and snapshot management interfaces
  • Required access: Permission to create, modify, restore, or otherwise manage an affected instance or snapshot
  • Trigger point: Processing a snapshot containing low-level runtime configuration
  • Why exploitation is possible: Snapshot handling does not consistently apply the configured restriction, allowing privileged hook settings to be accepted despite the policy

Why this happens

The vulnerability is caused by an authorization check being omitted or inconsistently applied during snapshot processing. Incus honors a restriction intended to block low-level configuration in some instance-management paths but fails to enforce it for snapshots. This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, because a security-sensitive operation is allowed without verifying that the caller or stored configuration has the required privilege.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the Incus server
  • Host confidentiality, integrity, and availability could be compromised
  • Other containers, virtual machines, or managed workloads could be affected
  • The attacker could gain a path to broader administrative or cluster-level impact

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization and restriction policies consistently across all instance lifecycle paths, including snapshots and restores.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Apply low-level configuration restrictions uniformly to creation, update, snapshot, copy, and restore operations
  • Use secure-by-default policies that reject host-sensitive hooks unless explicitly authorized
  • Reduce trust in snapshot metadata and revalidate it at every privilege boundary
  • Separate tenant-level instance permissions from host-management permissions
  • Run Incus with the least host privileges and isolate management interfaces from untrusted networks
  • Audit existing snapshots and configurations for unauthorized low-level settings

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this issue through:

  • Authorization-focused tests covering snapshot creation, transfer, restoration, and modification
  • Static and policy analysis that identifies low-level hook settings accepted outside privileged workflows
  • Code review checks ensuring restrictions are applied consistently across all lifecycle operations
  • Audit logging for snapshot actions and changes to raw.lxc, raw.qemu, or equivalent host-sensitive configuration
  • CI or admission policies that reject restricted workloads containing unauthorized low-level configuration

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-47w9-6r3f-938g
github.comgithub.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-48q5-w887-33wv

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through a remotely reachable Incus management interface when an attacker has sufficient instance or snapshot-management permissions. Network reachability alone is not necessarily sufficient.

The attacker generally needs authorization to perform relevant instance or snapshot operations, or access to a trusted workflow that imports or restores attacker-controlled snapshot metadata.

Enforce the low-level configuration restriction consistently at every snapshot and instance lifecycle boundary, and require explicit elevated authorization for host-sensitive hooks.

Use centralized authorization checks, test privilege boundaries across copy and restore paths, treat snapshot metadata as untrusted input, and monitor for changes to low-level runtime configuration.

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