Summary
A command injection flaw in the browserstack-cypress-cli allows user-controlled configuration file paths to be interpolated into shell commands without proper sanitization.
When a crafted cypress_config_file parameter is processed, shell metacharacters in the path can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary OS commands under the CLI's privileges.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in environments where the browserstack-cypress-cli is used to run Cypress tests and the cypress_config_file (or underlying cypress_config_filepath) value can be influenced by users, scripts, or CI configuration.
It is most relevant in shared CI/CD systems, automation pipelines, or developer tooling setups where test configuration paths are not tightly controlled and may incorporate user or project input.
The risk increases when the CLI runs with elevated privileges or has access to sensitive resources on the host system.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Command-line interface invocation of browserstack-cypress-cli, including CI/CD jobs, build scripts, and developer machines.
- Required access: Ability to supply or alter the cypress_config_file parameter (directly on the command line, via environment variables, or through scripts that pass it through).
- Trigger point: Execution of readCypressConfigUtil.js, specifically the loadJsFile() function, which builds a shell command using the cypress_config_filepath value and runs it via child_process.execSync().
- Why exploitation is possible: The user-controlled path is interpolated into a template literal that becomes part of a shell command. The value is only quoted superficially, so shell metacharacters such as
"and;can terminate the intended argument and introduce additional commands, leading to CWE-78 OS command injection.
Why this happens
The core issue is the construction of shell commands from untrusted input without robust quoting or escaping. In loadJsFile(), the cypress_config_filepath is embedded directly into a command string passed to child_process.execSync(), relying on shell parsing to interpret it.
This pattern maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where attacker-controlled data is treated as part of an operating system command.
Instead of separating arguments from the command interpreter, the implementation builds a single shell string and allows special characters (such as quotes and separators) to alter the command structure, enabling arbitrary command execution.
Potential impact
- Execution of arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the process running browserstack-cypress-cli.
- Reading, modifying, or deleting files accessible to the CLI user account.
- Exfiltration of CI/CD secrets such as API keys, access tokens, or SSH keys.
- Compromise of CI runners or developer machines and potential lateral movement within the network.
- Tampering with test results, build artifacts, or deployment pipelines.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation centers on eliminating the practice of building shell commands from untrusted strings and enforcing strict separation between data and command execution.
Useful defensive patterns include:
- Avoid using generic shell execution APIs (e.g., exec/execSync with command strings) for tasks involving user-influenced paths; prefer direct Node.js APIs or spawn/execFile with argument arrays that bypass shell interpretation.
- Treat configuration paths as pure data and validate them against expected formats, locations, and file extensions before use.
- Normalize and restrict file paths to known directories or whitelisted patterns, rejecting inputs containing shell metacharacters or path traversal sequences.
- Run CLI tools and CI jobs with least-privilege accounts and minimal filesystem/network access to limit impact even if command execution occurs.
- Adopt secure-by-default wrappers or helper utilities for executing external tools that enforce argument-based invocation instead of raw shell command construction.
How teams detect issues like this
Several approaches can help detect and monitor this class of vulnerability:
- Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag uses of child_process.exec/execSync (and similar APIs) where arguments are built from variable interpolation or concatenation involving user-derived values.
- Code review: During reviews of CLI and tooling code, look for patterns where configuration input influences shell command strings; enforce a policy that external commands must use parameterized invocation, not templated shell strings.
- Policy enforcement: Integrate linters or security checkers into CI pipelines to block merges when insecure process-spawning patterns are detected.
- Runtime monitoring: In sensitive environments, capture process creation logs (e.g., via audit frameworks) for CI runners and developer tooling to spot unusual command executions or unexpected use of the CLI as a launch point.

