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CVE-2026-48554

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in Nagios Notifications

CVE-2026-48554

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Authenticated Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

Nagios Core and Nagios XI contain an authenticated operating system command injection vulnerability in notification macro substitution. If a notification command places certain notification macros in a shell-executed position, an authenticated UI user may execute arbitrary commands as the nagios service account.

Affected context

The issue can arise in Nagios deployments where notification commands reference the

$NOTIFICATIONCOMMENT$ or $NOTIFICATIONAUTHOR$ macros and pass their expanded values

to a shell-reachable command position. Exploitation generally depends on a non-default

notification configuration and an authenticated user who can cause or influence a

notification event through the administrative interface.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Nagios Core or Nagios XI notification command processing
  • Required access: Authenticated access to the Nagios user interface, with sufficient ability to trigger or influence notifications
  • Configuration requirement: A notification command must reference a vulnerable NOTIFICATION-family macro in a shell-executed position
  • Trigger point: Macro substitution while Nagios constructs and executes the notification command
  • Why exploitation is possible: Unfiltered macro content can reach command interpretation without adequate separation between data and shell syntax

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from expanding attacker-influenced notification macro values

directly into a command line that can be interpreted by a shell. When metacharacters or

other command syntax are not safely separated from executable arguments, data becomes

executable input. This behavior maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as OS command injection.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary commands as the nagios service account
  • The monitoring server could be compromised
  • Monitoring data, configurations, or credentials could be altered or exposed
  • The attacker could use the compromised service context for further access, depending on permissions
  • Monitoring integrity and operational availability could be affected

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring notification data remains data rather than

executable command content.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Avoiding shell interpretation when invoking notification handlers
  • Passing macro values as separately bounded arguments through a safe process-execution API
  • Allowing only the notification fields and characters required by the command
  • Treating notification comments and author values as untrusted input
  • Restricting which authenticated roles can create, modify, or trigger notifications
  • Running the Nagios service with the minimum filesystem, process, and network privileges
  • Reviewing notification command definitions for shell-reachable macro expansions

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine configuration review, code analysis, and runtime monitoring.

Useful approaches include:

  • Searching notification command definitions for NOTIFICATION-family macros embedded in shell command strings
  • Static analysis for string concatenation or interpolation into shell execution APIs
  • Code review checks requiring explicit argument boundaries for external process execution
  • Policy enforcement that disallows untrusted macro values in executable command positions
  • Monitoring Nagios child-process creation and unusual commands launched by the nagios account
  • Auditing authenticated notification activity and changes to command definitions
  • Neutral automated security review tools can help identify risky command construction patterns

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NagiosEnterprises/nagioscore/blob/master/Changelog
nagios.comnagios.com/security-disclosures/nagios-core/
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/nagios-core-xi-authenticated-rce-via-unfiltered-notification-family-macro-substitution

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploited through the Nagios web interface when the required notification

configuration is present, but it is not generally unauthenticated. The attacker must

have authenticated access and an ability to influence or trigger the relevant workflow.

Exploitation depends on a non-default notification command that places

$NOTIFICATIONCOMMENT$ or $NOTIFICATIONAUTHOR$ in a shell-executed position.

Keep macro values separate from command syntax by using safe process-execution APIs with

bounded arguments. Avoid passing interpolated notification data through a shell.

Treat all notification fields as untrusted input, review command definitions during

configuration changes, restrict notification administration privileges, and monitor

processes launched by the Nagios service account.

Find out what's already
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