Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Parameter Handler of Online Enrollment

CVE-2026-4842

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Unauthorized Database Access and Data Manipulation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The Online Enrollment System 1.0 contains a SQL injection flaw in the Parameter Handler of /sms/grades/index.php?view=edit&id=1, where the deptid parameter is not safely handled before being used in database queries.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to inject arbitrary SQL, which may lead to unauthorized data access, modification, or deletion within the enrollment database.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in the Online Enrollment System 1.0 when HTTP requests to /sms/grades/index.php pass the deptid parameter to backend database logic without adequate sanitization or parameterization.

It typically manifests in deployments where user-controlled query parameters are concatenated directly into SQL statements, often in grade or department-related views, and where the database account used by the application has broad privileges over enrollment-related tables.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal web interface at /sms/grades/index.php handling grade and department information.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests (e.g., via browser, proxy, or script) to the affected endpoint; no prior authentication may be required depending on deployment configuration.
  • Trigger point: Processing of the deptid query parameter by the Parameter Handler that builds and executes SQL queries for the grades/department edit view.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application likely interpolates the deptid value directly into SQL statements without using prepared statements, proper input validation, or context-aware encoding, allowing attacker-controlled SQL fragments to alter the intended query logic.

Why this happens

The underlying defect is the construction of SQL queries by concatenating raw, user-provided input (deptid) into the query string instead of binding it as a parameter.

This insecure pattern maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, where meta-characters such as quotes, comment markers, or operators are not neutralized, allowing an attacker to break out of data context and inject new SQL clauses.

In practice, this often takes the form of building queries like SELECT ... WHERE deptid = '$deptid' without validation or parameter binding, combined with missing centralized input handling and lack of least-privilege database roles.

Potential impact

  • May allow attackers to read sensitive data from enrollment, grades, or user tables beyond their authorization.
  • Could enable modification or deletion of enrollment records, grades, and configuration data.
  • Can potentially be used to create or alter application accounts, impacting authentication and authorization.
  • May facilitate extraction of password hashes or other credentials stored in the database, enabling further compromise.
  • In some configurations, could be leveraged to execute database-specific functions that impact server integrity or availability.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation generally focuses on eliminating direct string concatenation in SQL queries and tightening data trust boundaries:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions involving user-supplied input, including deptid and similar parameters.
  • Apply centralized input validation for numeric and identifier parameters, enforcing strict type, length, and format constraints before reaching the data access layer.
  • Introduce a data access abstraction layer that disallows raw query construction in presentation or controller code and enforces safe query patterns by default.
  • Reduce database privileges for the application account to the minimum required, limiting the blast radius if an injection occurs.
  • Implement defense-in-depth controls such as query whitelisting, stored procedures that do not dynamically concatenate input, and consistent output handling to minimize error leakage that aids exploitation.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code, configuration, and runtime analysis:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or custom rules to flag dynamic SQL construction that includes $_GET, $_POST, or other user-controllable sources, especially in files like /sms/grades/index.php.
  • Code review: Look for SQL queries constructed with string concatenation or interpolation, absence of parameter binding APIs, and missing validation around parameters like deptid.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use web application firewalls (WAFs) or RASP solutions with rules to identify and block common SQL injection patterns in query parameters.
  • Logging and anomaly detection: Analyze database logs for unusual query patterns, such as UNION-based extractions, tautological conditions, or sudden spikes in failed queries, and correlate them with HTTP request logs targeting the grades and department editing endpoints.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/dsdsadawada/CVE1/issues/4
itsourcecode.comitsourcecode.com/
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.353148
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.353148
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.776132

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can reach the web interface and send crafted requests to /sms/grades/index.php can attempt to exploit the SQL injection remotely, subject to network exposure and access controls.

Not necessarily. Exploitation may be possible without authentication if the affected endpoint is accessible prior to login; if access is restricted to authenticated users, any account with permission to reach the grades edit view could serve as a starting point.

The most robust approach is to refactor database interactions to use parameterized queries or prepared statements everywhere, combined with strict input validation and centralized query-building logic that prevents direct concatenation of user input into SQL.

Establish secure coding standards that mandate parameterized queries, enforce them with code review and automated static analysis, validate and sanitize all external input at defined trust boundaries, and limit database privileges so that even if a flaw is missed, its impact is constrained.

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