Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Command Injection in Netcore Power 15AX Diagnostic Tool

CVE-2026-4840

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Network Appliance

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Netcore Power 15AX devices up to firmware 3.0.0.6938 contain an OS command injection flaw in the setTools function of /bin/netis.cgi, part of the Diagnostic Tool Interface.

By manipulating the IpAddr parameter remotely, an attacker can inject arbitrary system commands that execute with the privileges of the device's web management process.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the web-based Diagnostic Tool Interface exposed by Netcore Power 15AX devices running firmware versions up to 3.0.0.6938.

It affects deployments where:

  • The management web interface is reachable over the network (LAN or WAN, depending on configuration)
  • The /bin/netis.cgi handler is enabled and processes the setTools operation
  • Input from the IpAddr parameter is passed into OS-level diagnostic utilities without robust sanitization or strict parameterization

Exposure is higher when the administration interface is accessible from untrusted networks or the internet.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the Netcore Power 15AX management/diagnostic portal.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the device's web interface; authentication requirements depend on the specific device configuration and whether the diagnostic endpoint is protected.
  • Trigger point: Submitting a crafted HTTP request to /bin/netis.cgi invoking the setTools function with a malicious IpAddr value.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled data from the IpAddr parameter is concatenated into shell command strings or passed to a command execution API without sufficient validation, escaping, or use of safe system call interfaces, allowing the attacker to inject additional shell metacharacters and commands.

Why this happens

This issue is rooted in treating a user-supplied network address field (IpAddr) as trusted when constructing system commands.

The application likely builds a command (for example, to run ping, traceroute, or similar diagnostic utilities) by string-concatenating IpAddr directly into a shell command and invoking a generic command execution function (e.g., system, popen, or equivalent).

This pattern maps to:

  • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, where untrusted input is embedded into commands interpreted by the OS.
  • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, highlighting the lack of strict filtering for shell metacharacters.

The core design flaw is using shell parsing as part of application logic instead of parameterized, argument-based process invocation that treats user input as data only.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands on the device
  • Full compromise of the router/gateway configuration and management interface
  • Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the device
  • Interception, redirection, or manipulation of network traffic passing through the device
  • Use of the compromised device as a pivot point for attacks against internal networks
  • Enrollment of the device into botnets for DDoS campaigns or other abuse

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating unsafe command construction and reducing the trust boundary around administrative interfaces:

  • Replace shell-based command construction with APIs that invoke system utilities via parameterized argument lists, avoiding the shell entirely.
  • Enforce strict allowlists for fields like IpAddr, validating against expected formats (e.g., IP address or hostname syntax) and rejecting anything outside those constraints.
  • Normalize and sanitize all user-supplied data before use, removing or rejecting shell metacharacters and control operators rather than attempting ad-hoc escaping.
  • Apply least privilege to the web management process, ensuring it runs with minimal OS permissions so that a potential compromise yields limited control.
  • Restrict exposure of diagnostic and administrative interfaces to trusted networks only (e.g., management VLANs or VPN), and disable unused diagnostic features when feasible.
  • Design configuration and diagnostic features to be secure-by-default, avoiding hidden or undocumented endpoints and requiring explicit enablement for risky debug tools.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection and assurance efforts can combine code-centric and deployment-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to detect direct use of command execution functions (system, popen, exec*, shell_exec, backticks, etc.) where arguments include user-controllable parameters such as query string or form fields.
  • Code review: Flag any pattern where diagnostic tools (ping, traceroute, nslookup, etc.) are invoked via string-concatenated commands; reviewers should verify that all inputs pass through strict validation and are bound as discrete arguments.
  • Configuration and policy checks: Implement security policies requiring that administrative web interfaces are not exposed directly to the internet and that diagnostic endpoints are authenticated and logged.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use network intrusion detection and web application firewalls to identify anomalous requests containing shell metacharacters in parameters like IpAddr, and monitor devices for unusual outbound connections or command execution behavior.
  • Automated tooling: Employ firmware/static scanning tools that model user-input flows and highlight potential command-injection sinks for embedded and IoT firmware images.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/fakervsbln/netcore-power15ax-cve
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?ctiid.353146
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?id.353146
vuldb.comvuldb.com/?submit.776127

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As described, exploitation is possible remotely by sending crafted requests to the device's web interface, assuming the diagnostic endpoint is reachable over the network.

The attacker needs network access to the management/diagnostic HTTP interface. Whether authentication is needed depends on how the device is configured; if the endpoint is exposed without strong access control, even unauthenticated users on reachable networks may attempt exploitation.

The most robust pattern is to avoid shell command construction altogether. Use APIs that execute system utilities with parameterized argument arrays, and perform strict allowlist-based validation on parameters like IpAddr so they can only contain valid IP address or hostname formats.

Adopt secure coding standards that forbid embedding untrusted input into command strings, enforce input validation and encoding at all trust boundaries, and integrate security-focused code review and static analysis into the firmware development lifecycle, with particular attention to diagnostic and administrative functionality.

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