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CVE-2026-48240

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

SQL Injection in Open ISES Tickets statistics rollup

CVE-2026-48240

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Database Compromise / Data Integrity and Confidentiality Loss

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Open ISES Tickets before version 3.44.2 contains a SQL injection flaw in ajax/statistics.php where the tick_id and f_tick_id POST parameters are directly concatenated into WHERE clauses of SELECT queries.

An authenticated attacker who can submit crafted POST requests to the statistics endpoint may alter query semantics to read, modify, or destroy database contents.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the statistics rollup functionality of Open ISES Tickets, specifically within ajax/statistics.php.

It manifests when user-controlled POST parameters (tick_id and f_tick_id) are interpolated into SQL WHERE clauses without proper validation or parameterization.

This risk is present in deployments where the statistics endpoint is accessible to authenticated users and the application connects to a live production database with sensitive ticket or user data.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface for the Open ISES Tickets statistics AJAX endpoint (ajax/statistics.php).
  • Required access: Valid authenticated session with permission to access statistics functionality.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted POST requests containing malicious values in tick_id or f_tick_id to the statistics endpoint.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application concatenates these POST parameters directly into SQL WHERE clauses of SELECT statements without sanitization or use of bound parameters, allowing attacker-supplied fragments to change the structure and behavior of the queries.

Why this happens

This issue is a classic instance of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').

The underlying bug is the direct construction of SQL strings with raw user input from tick_id and f_tick_id, instead of using parameterized queries or safely constrained data types.

Because the input is treated as executable SQL syntax rather than as data, an attacker can inject additional conditions or statements that the database engine executes as part of the query.

The absence of rigorous input validation, type enforcement (e.g., integer casting), and prepared statements creates a trust gap between the HTTP layer and the database.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may read sensitive data from ticket and related tables that they are not authorized to access.
  • Database records can be modified, including ticket contents, user associations, and configuration data.
  • Important records may be deleted, leading to loss of ticket history and operational data.
  • Application behavior can be altered by corrupting reference data or configuration stored in the database.
  • In some configurations, SQL injection may be chained with database features to escalate to broader system compromise.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on preventing user input from being interpreted as SQL syntax and tightening the trust boundary between the web application and the database.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, especially where request parameters influence WHERE clauses.
  • Enforcing strict typing and whitelisting on identifier-like parameters (e.g., ensuring tick_id and f_tick_id are validated or cast to integers before use).
  • Centralizing database access through a data access layer that forbids ad-hoc string concatenation.
  • Applying least-privilege to database accounts so that the application only has the minimal rights necessary for its operations.
  • Implementing generic input validation and normalization policies that reduce the risk of control characters or SQL metacharacters being propagated to the query layer.

How teams detect issues like this

High-level detection strategies typically combine preventative checks in the development lifecycle with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag dynamic SQL construction that concatenates request parameters or other untrusted inputs, especially in files handling AJAX endpoints like ajax/statistics.php.
  • Code review: During manual review, look for patterns such as string-based SQL queries, inline interpolation of $_POST variables, and absence of prepared statement usage.
  • Security testing: Use targeted application security tests or dynamic scanners to exercise endpoints with potentially injectable parameters (e.g., tick_id, f_tick_id) and observe anomalous database responses.
  • Policy enforcement: Adopt coding standards that mandate the use of ORM methods or parameterized query APIs, and enforce these through pre-commit hooks or CI checks.
  • Monitoring and logging: Log unusual SQL errors and query patterns at the database layer, and alert on unexpected query shapes originating from web-facing endpoints.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openises/tickets/commit/ecfeb406a016766cae81c749e14b5145a9f2dbff
github.comgithub.com/openises/tickets/releases/tag/v3.44.2
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/open-ises-tickets-sql-injection-via-ajax-statistics-php-tick-id-and-f-tick-id-parameters

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it is exploitable over HTTP(S), but requires an authenticated user who can reach the ajax/statistics.php endpoint and submit crafted POST parameters.

The attacker needs a valid authenticated account with access to the statistics functionality. The exact role requirements depend on how Open ISES Tickets is configured, but the attack is not limited to administrators if regular users can access the endpoint.

The most robust fix is to replace all string-concatenated SQL with parameterized queries or ORM methods, ensuring that user inputs like tick_id and f_tick_id are bound as typed parameters. Additionally, enforce strict validation on these parameters (for example, integer casting) before they reach the database layer.

Prevention is best achieved by adopting secure coding practices: mandate prepared statements across the codebase, introduce a database abstraction layer that disallows raw SQL concatenation, enforce input validation and output encoding guidelines, and integrate static analysis and security testing into the CI/CD pipeline to catch injection patterns early.

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