Summary
Open ISES Tickets before version 3.44.2 contains a SQL injection flaw in ajax/mobile_main.php, where the id GET parameter is directly concatenated into a WHERE clause without sanitization.
An authenticated attacker can manipulate this parameter to alter the underlying SQL query, potentially reading, modifying, or deleting data in the application database.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the mobile AJAX endpoint ajax/mobile_main.php within Open ISES Tickets when processing the id parameter from an HTTP GET request.
The affected code path performs a ticket-existence sanity check by building a SELECT statement whose WHERE clause incorporates the id value directly.
Environments where users are authenticated into the ticketing system and can trigger this endpoint are exposed, especially when the same database stores other sensitive ticketing or user data.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) requests to the
ajax/mobile_main.phpendpoint in Open ISES Tickets. - Required access: Valid authenticated user session with permission to access the mobile/AJAX functionality.
- Trigger point: Submission of a crafted
idparameter in a GET request, causing the server to construct and execute a dynamic SQL query. - Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs SQL by string concatenation and injects the raw
idparameter into theWHEREclause without proper input validation, parameterization, or escaping, matching the SQL Injection pattern described by CWE-89.
Why this happens
This issue stems from dynamically constructing SQL queries using untrusted input without employing parameterized statements or rigorous validation.
The id GET parameter is concatenated directly into a WHERE clause, allowing attacker-controlled content to become part of the SQL command rather than being treated as data.
This is a textbook example of CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where user input can break out of the intended query structure and alter its logic.
Potential impact
- Attackers may read sensitive ticket data and user information beyond their authorized scope.
- Attackers may modify existing records, such as tampering with ticket contents, statuses, or ownership.
- Attackers may delete tickets or other database records, impacting system availability and data integrity.
- Depending on database configuration, attackers may escalate to broader database compromise, including access to other schemas or administrative operations.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation typically centers on ensuring that user input never changes the structure of SQL statements.
Recommended defensive patterns include:
- Using parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, treating the
idvalue strictly as data. - Applying strict server-side validation on identifier parameters (e.g., ensuring
idis numeric and within expected bounds). - Centralizing database access through a data access layer that forbids raw query string concatenation.
- Applying the principle of least privilege for the database account used by the application, limiting the potential damage if injection occurs.
- Implementing consistent input-handling policies that treat all incoming HTTP parameters as untrusted by default.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can use several approaches to detect this class of vulnerability:
- Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag string concatenation into SQL queries, particularly where request parameters (e.g.,
$_GET,$_POST) flow into query construction. - Code review: During manual reviews, look for inline SQL assembled from user input, absence of prepared statements, and multiple query fragments joined by string operators.
- Dynamic testing: Use web application scanners or manual penetration testing with crafted parameters to identify anomalous SQL behavior or error messages.
- Security gates: Enforce code-quality and security policies in CI/CD pipelines that prohibit introduction of non-parameterized SQL access patterns.

