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CVE-2026-48235

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

SQL Injection in Open ISES Tickets GPS Tracking Integration

CVE-2026-48235

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Arbitrary SQL Execution and Data Manipulation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Open ISES Tickets before 3.44.2 contains a SQL injection flaw in its remote GPS tracking integrations, where latitude, longitude, callsign, speed, altitude, and timestamp fields from external XML/JSON feeds are concatenated directly into SQL UPDATE/INSERT queries.

An attacker who can compromise or impersonate the external GPS tracking endpoint may inject arbitrary SQL, enabling manipulation of responder locations, track history, and assignment records within the application's database.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in deployments of Open ISES Tickets that:

  • Enable integration with remote GPS tracking services (e.g., InstaMapper, Google Latitude)
  • Consume latitude, longitude, callsign, mph, altitude, and timestamp values from external XML/JSON feeds
  • Build SQL UPDATE and INSERT statements in incs/remotes.inc.php by string-concatenating those values

The risk is present when the application treats data from the GPS provider as implicitly trusted and does not apply parameterization, validation, or escaping before sending it to the database.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The HTTP(S) endpoints that ingest GPS tracking updates or callbacks from remote services.
  • Required access: Ability to control or spoof the GPS tracking data source, such as:
  • Compromising a legitimate GPS provider account, API key, or device
  • Impersonating the GPS API endpoint or MITM-ing traffic if transport is not fully secured
  • Trigger point: Delivery of crafted XML or JSON payloads whose latitude, longitude, callsign, mph, altitude, or timestamp fields are incorporated into SQL statements.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application directly concatenates these untrusted fields into SQL strings without parameterization or proper sanitization, allowing arbitrary SQL fragments to be interpreted by the database engine.

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing SQL queries via string concatenation using untrusted data from remote GPS tracking feeds.

Instead of employing parameterized queries or prepared statements, the application interpolates values such as latitude, longitude, callsign, mph, altitude, and timestamps directly into UPDATE and INSERT statements.

This pattern corresponds to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where attacker-controlled input can break out of its intended data context and modify the structure or behavior of the SQL query.

Potential impact

  • Attackers can manipulate responder location, tracks, and assignment tables, falsifying operational situational awareness.
  • Stored GPS and tracking data can be altered, deleted, or fabricated, undermining historical records and audits.
  • Additional tables within the same database may be queried, modified, or truncated depending on database privileges.
  • Sensitive information stored in the database (e.g., incident details, user data) can be exfiltrated via crafted SQL.
  • Application stability may be affected through disruptive queries, causing downtime or data inconsistency.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing direct string concatenation of untrusted input into SQL and reducing the trust placed in external data sources:

  • Prefer parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions, binding GPS-related values as data parameters rather than building SQL command strings.
  • Introduce strict server-side validation and normalization for GPS fields (numeric ranges for latitude/longitude, speed, altitude; length and character constraints for callsigns; and canonical formats for timestamps).
  • Treat all data from remote tracking services as untrusted, even when using authenticated or whitelisted integrations, and handle it through a dedicated validation layer.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to the database account used for GPS updates so that it has only the minimal INSERT/UPDATE rights required for specific tables.
  • Implement input encoding or escaping at the database access layer as a defense-in-depth measure, while not relying on it as a primary control.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify and monitor this class of vulnerability using a combination of preventive and detective measures:

  • Static application security testing (SAST) rules that flag dynamic SQL construction, particularly in files handling external integrations (such as incs/remotes.inc.php), where variables from request bodies, XML/JSON parsers, or external APIs are directly embedded into queries.
  • Code review checklists that require developers to verify parameterized queries for all database operations involving external service data, with special scrutiny on integration modules.
  • Database activity monitoring (DAM) and logging that detect anomalous SQL patterns, unusual predicates, or stacked queries originating from the GPS update workflow.
  • Runtime application self-protection (RASP) or web application firewalls (WAF) configured with rules to detect common SQL injection signatures in GPS-related fields, while acknowledging that application-level validation is more reliable.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openises/tickets/commit/ecfeb406a016766cae81c749e14b5145a9f2dbff
github.comgithub.com/openises/tickets/releases/tag/v3.44.2
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/open-ises-tickets-sql-injection-via-incs-remotes-inc-php-multiple-parameters

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If an attacker can control or impersonate the external GPS tracking endpoint feeding data into Open ISES Tickets, they can remotely send malicious payloads that reach the vulnerable SQL construction code.

The attacker must be able to influence the GPS tracking data consumed by the application. This typically involves compromising a GPS device, account, API key, or the communication channel so they can send crafted XML/JSON responses that the system accepts as legitimate.

Replace all string-concatenated SQL with parameterized queries or prepared statements, and route all fields from external services through strict server-side validation and normalization before they reach the database layer.

Establish coding standards that prohibit dynamic SQL built from untrusted data, enforce automated checks for parameterization in database code, and design integration layers where external service data is always treated as untrusted input subject to validation, least privilege, and structured parsing before it is persisted.

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