Summary
Open ISES Tickets before 3.44.2 suffers from a SQL injection vulnerability where multiple POST parameters are directly concatenated into dynamically built SELECT, UPDATE, and DELETE statements.
An authenticated attacker who can control these parameters may alter query semantics to read, modify, or destroy database contents by injecting crafted SQL fragments.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the tables.php component of Open ISES Tickets when handling POST requests that control table and column identifiers.
Specifically, the tablename, indexname, and sortby parameters are used to build dynamic SQL statements for SELECT, UPDATE, and DELETE operations without proper validation.
This typically affects deployments where authenticated users can reach functionality that interacts with generic table views or administrative data listings.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of Open ISES Tickets, specifically endpoints handled by
tables.php. - Required access: Valid authenticated user session with permission to invoke the affected actions.
- User-controlled input: Ability to influence
tablename,indexname, and/orsortbyPOST parameters. - Trigger point: Execution of dynamically constructed SQL statements that interpolate these parameters directly into query text.
- Why exploitation is possible: User-supplied values are concatenated into SQL without parameterization or strict whitelist validation, allowing crafted input to break out of expected identifiers and inject arbitrary SQL fragments.
Why this happens
This issue stems from dynamically constructing SQL queries by concatenating raw user input into the query string rather than treating it as data.
In tables.php, POST parameters such as tablename, indexname, and sortby are interpolated directly into SELECT, UPDATE, and DELETE statements as table or column identifiers without sanitization or strict validation.
This pattern maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command, because the application does not neutralize or constrain special characters and SQL syntax, allowing attackers to alter the intended query structure.
The underlying design assumes that authenticated users will provide benign input and relies on trust instead of enforcing robust server-side validation and safe query construction.
Potential impact
- Attackers may read sensitive data from arbitrary database tables they can reference.
- Attackers may modify existing records, including ticket data, user information, or configuration entries.
- Attackers may delete records or entire tables, leading to data loss or denial of service.
- Attackers may escalate privileges by altering authorization-related data stored in the database.
- Attackers may tamper with application integrity, causing inconsistent or corrupted business data.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating raw string concatenation in SQL query construction and strictly controlling any dynamic identifiers:
- Prefer parameterized queries or prepared statements for all variable parts of SQL commands wherever supported by the database driver.
- When dynamic table or column selection is required, apply strict server-side whitelisting: only allow identifiers from a predefined, hard-coded list rather than accepting arbitrary user input.
- Centralize query-building logic so that developers cannot easily bypass safe patterns with ad hoc string concatenation.
- Reduce the need for highly dynamic SQL by refactoring features to operate on well-defined query paths instead of free-form table access.
- Apply least-privilege to database accounts so that even if a query is abused, it cannot access or modify unrelated schemas or critical system tables.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect and monitor for similar SQL injection issues using a combination of code-centric and operational approaches:
- Static analysis: Configure SAST rules to flag SQL string concatenation that incorporates request parameters or other tainted input, especially in generic table-handling scripts.
- Code review: During manual review, look for patterns where table names, column names, or ORDER BY clauses are built from user input without a whitelist or mapping layer.
- Automated policy enforcement: Use pre-commit hooks or CI checks that disallow direct concatenation of request-derived variables into SQL query strings.
- Runtime monitoring: Enable database and application logging to capture unusual queries (e.g., multiple statements, unexpected functions, or always-true predicates) for later analysis.
- Security testing: Incorporate authenticated SQL injection tests into regular DAST or penetration testing to exercise administrative and internal views that may not be reachable anonymously.

