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CVE-2026-48119

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in Nezha Monitoring

CVE-2026-48119

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Integrity Violation of Monitoring Data

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Nezha Monitoring allows authenticated agents to forge monitoring results for services owned by other users due to missing authorization checks.

When an agent can submit data on behalf of unrelated services, attackers may corrupt monitoring dashboards, hide outages, or manipulate operational decisions.

Affected context

The issue arises in Nezha Monitoring deployments where multiple users or tenants register agents and services within the same monitoring instance.

In affected versions, the backend accepts monitoring results from authenticated agents without consistently verifying that the agent is authorized to report for a specific service.

This creates a cross-tenant trust problem whenever agents can reach the central Nezha server and submit status or performance data.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Monitoring data submission interface used by Nezha agents (typically HTTP/WebSocket or similar).
  • Required access: Valid, authenticated agent credentials for any user within the Nezha instance.
  • Trigger point: Submission of monitoring or service-check results, crafted to reference services belonging to other users.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side logic authenticates the agent but does not reliably enforce authorization tying that agent to a specific owner/service mapping, allowing one agent to impersonate another service's telemetry.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from a missing or incomplete authorization check on the server side when associating incoming monitoring results with specific services.

The system verifies that the submitting client is an authenticated agent, but it does not consistently ensure that this agent is permitted to report data for the targeted service identifier.

Conceptually, this maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where access control is performed only at the authentication layer and not at the level of individual resources or actions.

The flawed pattern is trusting any authenticated agent as authorized for any service, instead of enforcing a strict agent-to-service ownership relation.

Potential impact

  • Attackers can falsify uptime or health metrics for other users' services.
  • Monitoring dashboards and alerts may be manipulated, causing hidden or falsely reported outages.
  • Operations teams may make incorrect remediation decisions based on forged data.
  • Incident response timelines can be delayed by misleading or noisy monitoring signals.
  • Compliance or reporting based on monitoring logs may be rendered unreliable.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening authorization around telemetry submission paths and enforcing clear ownership boundaries:

  • Enforce strong server-side authorization that binds each agent to a defined set of services it may report on.
  • Treat service identifiers in incoming payloads as untrusted; derive the allowed service scope from the authenticated agent context rather than client-provided fields.
  • Apply least privilege principles so that each agent has the minimal service scope necessary for its deployment.
  • Add multi-tenant isolation controls, such as tenant or user scoping for all monitoring data and configuration operations.
  • Implement defense-in-depth logging and anomaly detection to flag inconsistent or cross-tenant submissions, even when basic checks are in place.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves reviewing both code and runtime behavior for authorization gaps:

  • Use static analysis or manual code review to locate endpoints where agents submit monitoring results and ensure resource-level authorization checks are present.
  • Look for patterns where authenticated agent identifiers are accepted but not cross-checked with the target service or owner in server-side logic.
  • Analyze logs for anomalies, such as a single agent reporting on multiple owners' services or sudden changes in reporting patterns.
  • Incorporate security tests in CI/CD that attempt cross-tenant submissions to verify that the backend rejects unauthorized telemetry.
  • Where feasible, deploy runtime application monitoring to alert on suspicious cross-user or cross-tenant interactions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-4g6j-g789-rghm

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, but only through authenticated agents. Any agent that can reach the Nezha server and authenticate can attempt to forge results for other users' services if authorization checks are missing.

The attacker needs valid agent-level access within the affected Nezha Monitoring instance. They do not need direct access to the victim's services, only the ability to submit monitoring data as an agent.

Implement strict server-side authorization that binds each authenticated agent to a specific set of services or a tenant context, and ensure all monitoring submissions are validated against that mapping, ignoring or rejecting any out-of-scope targets.

Adopt a defense-in-depth access control model: separate authentication from authorization, enforce resource-level checks for every sensitive action, design multi-tenant boundaries explicitly, and include targeted access control testing in regular security reviews and automated test suites.

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