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CVE-2026-48087

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Authentication Bypass (CWE-287) in OpenReception Platform

CVE-2026-48087

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Account Takeover

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical authentication flaw in OpenReception's passkey registration flow can associate an attacker-controlled WebAuthn credential with another user's account. When the attacker knows the victim's email and user ID, a later passkey login may issue a session for the victim without requiring the victim's existing authenticator.

Affected context

The issue occurs in OpenReception deployments using the registration endpoint

POST /api/auth/register/{userId} before version 1.0.2. The handler verifies

that the WebAuthn challenge corresponds to the registration cookie's email, but

does not sufficiently bind the URL user ID to that same account identity.

Exploitability depends on the attacker knowing or obtaining the target user's

email and user ID; maintainers should assess all routes and administrative

surfaces that may expose those values.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The unauthenticated WebAuthn passkey registration endpoint
  • Required access: No authenticated account is inherently required; the attacker must know the victim's email and user ID
  • Trigger point: Registration processing that stores a newly validated passkey under the URL-selected user
  • Why exploitation is possible: The challenge and registration cookie are checked against the attacker's identity, while the URL user ID is not adequately verified as belonging to that identity
  • Resulting condition: The attacker's authenticator can become an accepted credential for the victim's account

Why this happens

The registration handler validates related authentication inputs independently

rather than enforcing a single, consistent identity binding across the

registration cookie, WebAuthn challenge, URL user ID, and passkey record.

Consequently, a valid ceremony for one email can be persisted against a

different user selected through the request path. This is a broken

authentication and identity-association pattern mapped to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, because the system does not reliably establish

that the credential being registered belongs to the account being modified.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain an authenticated session as another user
  • Victim accounts could be taken over through an attacker-controlled passkey
  • Sensitive appointments, profile data, or tenant information could be exposed
  • Attackers could modify account settings or perform actions with the victim's privileges
  • Compromised accounts could enable further tenant-level abuse

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on enforcing server-side identity consistency

throughout passkey registration and authentication.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving the target account from a trusted, authenticated registration context rather than trusting a path identifier alone
  • Verifying that the URL user ID, registration email, challenge, session or cookie state, and credential owner all refer to the same account
  • Rejecting mismatched identity values before any credential record is written
  • Making credential registration transactional and atomic with the identity checks
  • Requiring an existing authenticated factor or equivalent account-verification step when adding a new passkey
  • Applying least privilege to credential-management operations and limiting account enumeration
  • Auditing and protecting endpoints, invitation links, and administrative views that expose user IDs or email addresses
  • Logging anomalous passkey registrations and notifying users when new authenticators are added

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can include:

  • Static analysis and code review rules that flag account-selection identifiers taken directly from URL paths during credential registration
  • Reviewing whether every identity field is cross-validated before passkey records are created
  • Testing mismatched combinations of email, challenge, cookie, session, and user ID in authorization-focused integration tests
  • Monitoring for passkey registrations where the initiating identity differs from the account receiving the credential
  • Enforcing API policies that require explicit authorization checks for credential-management endpoints
  • Using automated security review tools to identify missing object-level authorization and inconsistent identity binding

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/5f61a2116d68378366edd712c343a9de7b205a74
github.comgithub.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-j9rw-x2wv-h5rj

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploitable through the registration API without a local foothold when the attacker can reach the endpoint and knows the target user's email and user ID.

The described registration path is unauthenticated, so an existing account may not be required. Knowledge of the target identity values and successful completion of the attacker's own WebAuthn ceremony are the important conditions.

Bind every registration input to one server-verified account context, reject any mismatch before persistence, and require an appropriate existing authentication factor before adding a new credential.

Treat user IDs and credential-management operations as authorization-sensitive, test cross-account identity mismatches, minimize identifier exposure, and monitor newly registered authenticators.

Find out what's already
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