/

CVE-2026-48084

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Missing Login Throttling (CWE-307) in OpenReception

CVE-2026-48084

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Insufficient Login Attempt Throttling

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Account Takeover

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenReception versions before 1.0.2 do not consistently throttle failed passphrase login attempts. An attacker who knows an account's email address may submit repeated guesses, enabling credential stuffing or dictionary attacks against passphrases that are weak, reused, or based on common patterns.

Affected context

The issue occurs in OpenReception's passphrase authentication flow at the login endpoint when failed attempts are not recorded or subject to the throttling mechanism used by another authentication path. It is particularly risky for accounts with predictable, reused, or compromised passphrases, even when those passphrases satisfy a minimum-length requirement. The presence of a working throttle for WebAuthn requests indicates that deployment-specific authentication configuration may affect exposure.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The passphrase login endpoint.
  • Required access: Knowledge of a target account's email address or another valid account identifier; prior authentication is not required for guessing.
  • Trigger point: Repeated failed passphrase submissions for the same account.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The passphrase branch does not invoke the existing per-account failed-attempt throttle, allowing guesses to continue at a rate primarily limited by password-hashing cost and available resources.

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an inconsistent application of authentication-rate controls. The backend records or throttles failed attempts for the WebAuthn challenge flow but omits equivalent enforcement in the passphrase branch. This maps to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts, because the system does not adequately limit repeated authentication failures and therefore permits automated credential-guessing activity.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may discover weak or reused account passphrases.
  • Compromised accounts could permit unauthorized access to appointments and associated personal information.
  • Successful credentials could be reused against other services.
  • High-volume guessing could increase authentication-service resource consumption.
  • An attacker may alter account data or perform actions available to the compromised user.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on applying consistent, server-side controls to every authentication method and failure path.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing per-account and, where appropriate, per-source rate limits after failed passphrase attempts.
  • Returning a temporary, policy-controlled lockout or progressive delay after repeated failures.
  • Ensuring throttling is applied before expensive verification work when doing so does not create account-enumeration risks.
  • Combining account controls with network-level and device-aware abuse detection.
  • Using passphrase screening that rejects commonly breached, predictable, or dictionary-based secrets rather than relying only on length.
  • Preserving generic authentication responses and consistent timing to reduce account-enumeration signals.
  • Limiting privileges and session capabilities available immediately after authentication.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine application telemetry, code review, and automated policy checks.

  • Monitor repeated failures by account, source, device, and time window, including accounts with sustained attempts below broad network thresholds.
  • Alert on authentication flows whose failure rates or request volumes differ materially from protected methods such as WebAuthn.
  • Review authentication handlers for missing calls to shared failed-attempt recording, delay, lockout, or rate-limit services.
  • Use static analysis and secure code review rules to identify login branches that perform credential verification without invoking centralized abuse controls.
  • Test authentication policies with automated checks that verify limits are enforced consistently across all supported login methods.
  • Validate that rate limits cannot be bypassed by changing request metadata, account identifiers, or authentication-flow parameters.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/b283dbb670e09112299fb0cf89f3cb054ecc1700
github.comgithub.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-hhg5-xmjg-3m93

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. It can generally be exercised through the exposed passphrase login endpoint, provided the attacker can reach the service and knows a target email address or account identifier.

No prior authentication is normally needed. The main prerequisites are access to the login endpoint and a valid account identifier; successful compromise still depends on guessing a usable passphrase.

Apply centralized, server-side failed-attempt throttling consistently to the passphrase flow and every other authentication method, with controls that resist account and source rotation.

Treat rate limiting as a mandatory control in shared authentication middleware, test every login branch for equivalent enforcement, and supplement minimum-length rules with breached-secret and dictionary screening.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.